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PREFACE 
The following conventions have been observed: 
Examples are marked by a solid line in the left-hand margin. 
Theorems are numbered in the form x.y, where x is the number of the relevant chapter 
and y indicates the sequence within the chapter. Corollaries to theorems are given the 
same numbers as the theorems from which they follow. 
'Common sense' is spelt as 'common-sense' wherever the term is used as an adjective 
qualifying the noun 'reasoning'. 
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SUMMARY 
We show how the non-monotonic nature of common-sense reasoning can be formalised by 
circumscription. Various forms of circumscription are discussed. A new form of circumscription, 
namely naive circumscription, is introduced in order to facilitate the comparison of the various 
forms. Finally, some issues connected with the automation of circumscriptive reasoning are 
examined. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Non-monotonic logic attempts to formalise common-sense reasoning about some or other "system" 
or "world". The first task is to describe the system of interest (normally given in sentences of 
cominon speech) using a formal notation. (Although other languages for knowledge representation 
are known, we will consider only knowledge representation in first- and second-order logic.) The 
second task is to formalise the common-sense reasoning. Circumscription is an attempt to do this, 
and is most conveniently expressed in terms of second-order logic. 
The present chapter surveys the technical machinery necessary for the first task. Subsequent 
chapters describe various forms of circumscription and assess the adequacy of these for the second 
task. 
First-order logic 
The description of a system of interest generally consists of statements concerning relations 
between, and operations on, specified "objects" in the system. To be able to represent our 
knowledge about the system, we firstly need a number of symbols to represent those objects we 
wish to single out, the relations between the objects and the operations on them. 
The symbols form the alphabet of a first-order language, which may formally be viewed as the 
union of three disjoint sets: 
• A set of logical symbols, usually containing 
· Parentheses: ( and ) 
· Sentential connective symbols: --., ...., , /\ , v and - (representing the notions if-
then, not, and, or and if-and-only-if, respectively) 
· Quantifier symbols: v and 3 (representing the notions for all and for some, 
respectively) 
• A set of constant symbols, comprising 
· Zero or more individual constants (representing some or all of the objects in the 
system of interest) 
· Zero or more predicate constants (representing the relations between objects) 
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· Zero or more function constants (representing the operations on objects) 
• A set of variable symbols, comprising 
· A countably infinite number of individual variables (intended to range over the 
objects in the system). 
The choice of constant symbols will depend on the particular system being formalised. 
In general, the choice of individual constants depends on the objects one wishes to name in the 
system. Consequently, the individual constant symbols may be single letters, e.g. a, b and c, 
numerals, e.g. 0, I and J13, or strings of characters, e.g. Tweety, apple3 and Nixon. 
The choice of predicate constants depends on the relevant relations holding between objects in the 
system. The predicate constant symbols may be single letters, e.g. A, P and Q, or strings of 
letters, e.g. Bird, Paci.fist and Ab. Subscripts are sometimes appended to distinguish different 
predicates, e.g. P1, Pm, Ab1 and Ab2. 
Similarly, the choice of function constants depends on the operations on objects. The function 
constant symbols are strings of letters, e.g. f, g and succ. Subscripts are sometimes appended to 
distinguish different functions, e.g. fi, f2 and fi13. 
Every predicate and function constant has a non-negative integer associated with it, denoting its 
arity. The arity of a predicate or function constant represents the number of arguments it takes. 
A distinguished 2-ary predicate constant symbol, = , called equality, is often included in a first-
order alphabet. 
The individual variables are generally single letters (we restrict them to lower case letters near the 
end of the alphabet), e.g. x, y and z. Subscripts can also be appended to distinguish different 
variables, e.g. x1, x2 and xm. 
As an example, consider a common system studied in Artificial Intelligence, namely a 
blocks world. In this system, a number of blocks of different size and colour are placed 
on a table. The blocks are named so that statements can be made about their properties 
and their relative positions (for instance, whether one block is stacked on another). 
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An example of an alphabet of symbols for the Blocks World is: 
Individual constants: a, b, c; representing separate blocks 
Predicate constants: Grey, White, BiggerThan, SameSize, On; representing properties of 
blocks and relationships between them. 
Function constant: top; representing a function to determine which block is the topmost of 
a stack of blocks. 
(All the logical symbols and all the individual variable symbols are included in the 
language.) 
An alphabet S uniquely determines a first-order language, the expressions of which serve to 
represent statements about the system of interest, by the following two-stage process: firstly a 
subset of S* (the set of strings over the alphabet) whose members are called terms is defined and 
secondly a subset of S* whose members are called well1ormedformulas (l1ffs) is defined. The set 
of wffs is the first-order language. 
•Terms: 
The set of terms over an alphabet S is the smallest subset of S * such that 
· if c is an individual constant then c is a term 
· if x is an individual variable then x is a term 
·if ti, .. ,tn are terms andf is an n-ary function constant then.f{ti, .. ,tn) is a term. 
• Well-formed formulas: 
The set of wffs is the smallest subset of S* such that 
·if t1, .. ,tn are terms and Pis an n-ary predicate constant then P(t1, .. ,tn) is a wff 
· if a and (3 are wffs and x is any individual variable, then the following are all 
wffs: 
(•a) 
(a--+ (3) 
(a /\ (3) 
(a V (3) 
(a - (3) 
'v'X(a) 
3.x(a) 
the negation of a 
the conditional with antecedent a and consequent (3 
the conjunction of a and (3 
the disjunction of a and (3 
the biconditional involving a and (3 
the universal quantification of x in a 
the existential quantification of x in a. 
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In what follows, parentheses will often be omitted where ambiguity will not arise. When a 
language includes the equality predicate, we write it between the two terms forming its arguments. 
In other words, if t1 and tz are two terms forming the arguments of the equality predicate, we 
write t1 = tz rather than = (ti,tz). 
When we represent our knowledge about some system of interest in a first- order language, we in 
effect single out a set of wffs. Such a set of wffs is called a set of axioms. It is important to note 
that we make no distinction between a finite set of axioms and the conjunction of all its separate 
wffs. Generally speaking, when we represent our knowledge about some real (as opposed to 
mathematical) system, the result is a finite set of axioms. 
Terms which contain no variables are called ground terms. Wffs which contain no sentential 
connective or quantifier symbols are called atomic formulae or simply atoms. Atoms which 
contain no variables are called ground atoms. 
The axioms we consider will always be wffs of the kind called sentences. Sentences may be 
thought of as wffs in which either no variables occur or the variables which do occur are bound. 
More precisely: 
The scope of a quantifier is the shortest substring following it which is itself a wff. 
An occurrence of a variable x in a wff is bound iff it is in the scope of a vx or 3.X, 
otherwise it is free. 
Wffs which contain no free occurrences of variables are called sentences. 
A wff commencing with a number of universal (existential) quantifiers is often abbreviated by 
using only a single universal (existential) quantifier symbol: 
and 
Vx1(Vx2( .. V'Xn( a) .. )) is abbreviated to V'X1. .Xn( a) 
3.X1(3.X2( .. 3.Xn( a) .. )) is abbreviated to 3.X1 .. Xn( a). 
Consider, for example, the language given previously for the Blocks World. A set of 
axioms describing the Blocks World may be divided into two classes; those which are true 
for any number and arrangement of blocks and those which describe a particular state of 
affairs. 
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Some axioms describing a certain state of affairs in the Blocks World are: 
Grey(a) A Grey(b) A White(c) 
BiggerThan(IJ.,b) A SameSize(b,c) 
On(a,c) 
Some further axiomS making general statements about any number and arrangements of 
blocks are: 
vx( Grey(x) - • White(x)) 
vxy( •(BiggerThan(x,y) v SameSize(x,y)) -+ BiggerThan(y,x)) 
vx(•3y(On(y,x))-+ top(x) = x) 
vxyz(On(x,y) A top(x) ....=.... z-+ top(y) z) 
Semantics of a first-order language 
When choosing individual, predicate and function constant symbols for a given system, we have 
an intended interpretation in mind for each of these symbols. Other interpretations may also be 
possible. In order to avoid ambiguity, it is necessary to be explicit about interpretations. We 
therefore make precise the concept of an interpretation. 
An interpretation I of a first-order language consists of 
• A domain: a non-empty set of 11 objects 11 , denoted by I I I 
• A function from the constant symbols to their denotations, namely to members of, 
relations on, or functions over the domain. More precisely 
· Every individual constant, C;, is mapped to a specific element of I I I , namely 
c.I 
I 
· Every n-ary predicate constant, P;, is mapped to a specific n-ary relation on 
I I I , i.e. a set of n-tuples of I I I n, namely P/ 
· Every n-ary function constant, f;, is mapped to a specific n-ary function from 
I I I n to I I I , namely f;1• 
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For example, an interpretation I for the Blocks World language is: 
I I I = {BLOCKA,BLOCKB,BLOCKC} 
a1 = BLOCKA, b1 = BLOCKB, c1 = BLOCKC 
Grey1 = {BLOCKA,BLOCKB}, White = {BLOCKC} 
BiggerThan' = { (BLOCKA,BLOCKB),(BLOCKA,BLOCKC)} 
SameSize'- = {(BLOCKB,BLOCKC)} 
On' = { (BLOCKA,BLOCKC)} 
top1(BLOCKA) = BLOCKA 
top'(BLOCKB) = BLOCKB 
top'(BLOCKC) = BLOCKA. 
Another interpretation I' is: 
I r I = {1,2,3, ... } 
a'' = 2, b1' = 3, c1' = 4 
Grey1' = {1,3,5, ... }, White' = {2,4,6, ... } 
BiggerThan'' = {(x,y) E I I' I 2: x > y} 
SameSize'-' = {(x,y) E I I' I 2 : x = y} 
On'' = {(x,y) E I I' I 2 : x is a factor of y less than y} 
top''(x) = 1 for all x E I I' I . 
A valuation in an interpretation I is a function v which assigns to every individual variable X; an 
element of I I I , namely v(x;). 
Note that if there are two or more elements in the domain, there are an infinite number of 
valuations. 
Given a valuation v in an interpretation I of a first-order language, a corresponding term-value 
function v is defined from the set of terms to the domain of I, as follows: 
· v( c;) = c/, for every individual constant c; 
· v(x;) = v(x;), for every individual variable x; 
· v(f;(t1, •• ,tn)) = J/(v(t1), •• ,v(tn)), for every function constant fl, where t1, •• ,tn are terms of 
the language. 
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A valuation v is said to satisfy a wff in an interpretation I under the following conditions: 
·if a is an atomic wff, i.e. a = P;(t1,..,1n), then v satisfies a iff then-tuple (v(t1), •• ,v(1n)) 
is in the relation p,1 
· v satisfies (..,a) iff v does not satisfy a 
· v satisfies (a -+ (3) iff v does not satisfy a or v satisfies (3 
· v satisfies (a A (3) iff v satisfies a and v satisfies (3 
· v satisfies (a v (3) iff v satisfies a or v satisfies (3 or both 
· v satisfies (a - (3) iff v satisfies both a and (3 or neither a nor (3 
· v satisfies Vx;( a) iff every valuation v' which differs from v at most in the value it 
assigns to X;, satisfies a 
· v satisfies 3.x;(a) iff there is some valuation v' which differs from v at most in the value 
it assigns to X;, which satisfies a. 
A wff is true in an interpretation I iff it is satisfied by all possible valuations in I. A wff is false in 
an interpretation I iff it is not satisfied by any valuations in I. Sentences have the property that 
they are satisfied either by all valuations in I or by none. 
A wff is logically valid iff it is true in every interpretation. A wff is contradictory iff it is false in 
every interpretation. 
Given a set of wffs A, an interpretation M is called a model of A iff all wffs of A are true in the 
interpretation M. A is said to be satisfiable iff it has a model, otherwise it is unsatisfiable. 
Both interpretations given above for the Blocks World, namely I and I', are models of the 
axioms because all the axioms are true in the respective interpretations. 
We note the importance of the general axioms about any number and arrangements of 
blocks. They restrict the class of models of the axioms to a much smaller class of models 
containing the intended interpretation. Although they do not prevent the "unintended" 
second interpretation from being a model, they do prevent a large class of "nonsense" 
interpretations, for example the following interpretation J: 
I J I = {BLOCKA,BLOCKB,BLOCKC} 
d = BLOCKA, b1 = BLOCKB, c1 = BLOCKC 
Grey1 = {BLOCKA,BLOCKB,BLOCKC} 
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White = {BLOCKA,BLOCKC} 
BiggerThan1 = { (BLOCKA,BLOCKB),(BLOCKB,BLOCKA)} 
SameSize = {(BLOCKB,BLOCKC)} 
On1 = { (BLOCKA,BLOCKC),(BLOCKB,BLOCKC)} 
top1(BLOCKA) = BLOCKB 
top1(BLOCKB) = BLOCKC 
top1(BLOCKC) = BLOCKA. 
To see that interpretation J is not a model of the axioms, consider any valuation v in J 
with v(x) = BLOCKB. The valuation does not satisfy the first (general) axiom, namely 
vx(Grey(x) - •White(x)), because the valuation v' identical to v except that v'(x) = 
BLOCKA does not satisfy Grey(x) - ··White(x) since BLOCKA E Grey and BLOCKA 
E White. 
If A is a set of wffs and a is a single wff, then A semantically entails a iff every valuation in 
every model of A satisfies a. We write A f= a to indicate that A semantically entails a. We write 
I= a iff a is true in every interpretation, i.e. a is logically valid. 
One of the properties of I= is monotonicity: if A f= a then A U {{3} f= a. In other words, if a is 
entailed by a set of axioms A, then this remains the case regardless of how we may choose to 
augment A by additional information. One of the main characteristics of common-sense reasoning 
is that it moves from knowledge (represented by A) to a 'conclusion' (perhaps better regarded as a 
conjecture) which may be need to be retracted in the light of additional information. In other 
words, the formalisation of common-sense reasoning must involve some way of getting around the 
monotonicity of f=. 
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Second-order logic 
Second-order languages are very similar to first-order languages, as will become apparent. The 
principle difference is that second-order languages have not only variables ranging over individual 
objects in the domain of interpretation but also variables taking relations and functions as values. 
The need for the second-order variables is illustrated in the following example: 
Consider the problem of expressing the principle of mathematical induction as a well-
formed formula. The principle of mathematical induction is based on the fact that the set 
of natural numbers N is the smallest set containing 0 and having the property that if x 
belongs to it, so does the successor of x. Any property P defines a subset of N. The 
principle of mathematical induction merely states that the subset defined by P, if it 
contains 0 and is closed under the formation of successors, must be equal to N - it cannot 
be a proper subset, since N is the smallest set with the relevant characteristics. For a 
property P, we can express this as follows: 
(P(O) A vx(P(x) ..., P(succ(x)))) - vx(NatNum(x) ..., P(x)) 
The problem with this statement is that it is about a specific property P. The principle of 
induction makes a general statement about all properties. In other words, we would like to 
use a predicate variable, say 4> (ranging over all possible subsets of N) instead of the 
predicate constant P. This gives the second-order wff 
v4>((4>(0) A vx(4>(x) - 4>(succ(x)))) - vx(NatNum(x) ..., 4>(x))) 
A second-order language is specified by an alphabet of symbols as well as rules for forming 
expressions in the form of strings of symbols. 
An alphabet of a second-order language consists of the union of three disjoint sets: 
• A set of logical symbols, usually containing 
· Parentheses: ( and ) 
·Sentential connective symbols: -, •, A, v and -
·Quantifier symbols: v and 3 
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• A set of constant symbols, comprising 
· Zero or more individual constants 
· Zero or more predicate constants 
· Zero or more function constants 
• A set of variable symbols, comprising 
· A countably infinite number of individual variables 
·A countably infinite number of predicate variables 
·A countably infinite number of function variables. 
A distinguished predicate constant symbol, =, called equality, will be included in every second-
order alphabet. 
The predicate variable symbols may be taken to be uppercase letters of the Greek alphabet, e.g. qi 
and 'Ir. Subscripts can be appended to distinguish different predicate variables, e.g. q,1 and q,m. 
The function variable symbols will be taken to be lowercase letters of the Greek alphabet, e.g. </> 
and if;. (Lowercase letters at the beginning of the Greek alphabet, e.g. a and {3, are sometimes 
used to refer to arbitrary wffs). Subscripts can be appended to distinguish different function 
variables, e.g. </>1 and <f>m. 
Every predicate and function constant or variable has a non-negative integer associated with it, 
denoting its arity. The arity of a predicate or function constant or variable represents the number 
of arguments it takes. 
An alphabet S uniquely determines a second-order language by the following two-stage process: 
Firstly, a subset of S* (the set of strings over S), whose members are called terms, is defined, and 
then a subset of S*, whose members are called welljormedformulas (ttffs), is defined. The set of 
wffs is the second-order language. 
•Terms: 
The set of terms over the alphabet S is the smallest subset of S * such that 
· if c is an individual constant then c is a term 
· if x is an individual variable then x is a term 
·if ti, .. ,tn are terms andfis an n-ary function constant then.f(t1, .. ,tn) is a term 
·if ti, .. ,tn are terms and</> is an n-ary function variable then </>(t1, .. ,tn) is a term. 
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• Well-formed formulas: 
The set of wffs is the smallest subset of S * such that 
·if ti, .. ,tn are terms and Pis an n-ary predicate constant then P(t1, .. ,tn) is a wff 
·if ti, .. ,t:n are terms and <I> is an n-ary predicate variable then <I>(ti, .. ,tn) is a wff 
· if a and f3 are wffs and X is any individual, predicate or function variable, then 
the following are all wffs 
(•a) the negation of a 
(a -+ /3) the conditional with antecedent a and consequent /3 
(a /\ /3) the conjunction of a and /3 
(a v (3) the disjunction of a and (3 
(a - (3) the biconditional involving a and (3 
VX(a) 
3X(a) 
the universal quantification of X in a 
the existential quantification of X in a. 
Terms which contain no variables are called ground terms. Wffs which contain no sentential 
connective or quantifier symbols are called atomic formulae or simply atoms. Atoms which 
contain no variables are called ground atoms. 
The scope of a quantifier is the shortest substring following it which is itself a wff. An occurrence 
of a (individual, predicate or function) variable X in a wff is bound iff it is in the scope of a vX or 
3X, otherwise it is free. Wffs which contain no free occurrences of variables are called sentences. 
As an example of a set of second-order axioms, consider the Peano axioms for the natural 
numbers [Enderton 1977] in the language whose alphabet contains the individual constant 
c (intended to represent zero) and the function constant succ (intended to represent the 
injective successor function): 
vx( •succ(x) = c) 
vxy(succ(x) = succ(y)-+ x = y) 
v<I>((<I>(c) /\ vx(<I>(x)-+ <I>(succ(x))))-+ vx(<I>(x))) 
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Standard semantics of a second-order language 
To formally describe the meaning of the symbols of a second-order language, the concept of an 
interpretation must be made precise. 
A standard interpretation I of a second-order language consists of 
• A domain: a non-empty set of 11 objects 11 , denoted by I I I 
• A function from the constant symbols to their denotations, namely to elements of, 
relations on and functions over the domain. More precisely 
· Individual constants, C;, are mapped to specific elements of I I I , namely c/ 
·Predicate constants, P;, are mapped to specific n-ary relations on I I I , i.e, sets 
of n-tuples of I I I n, namely P/ 
· Function constants, f;, are mapped to specific n-ary functions from I I I n to 
I I I, namely.f?. 
One interpretation I of the language (indeed, the intended interpretation) in which the 
above axiomatisation of the natural numbers is formulated, is 
I I I = N 
c' = 0 
= 
1 is the identity relation on N (i.e. {(x,y) E NI x = y}) 
succ' is the successor function on N. 
Another interpretation J of the same language is 
I J I = {0,1,2} 
c' = 0 
= 
1 is the identity relation on {O, 1,2} 
succ' is the successor function for modulo 3 arithmetic on {0,1,2}, i.e. the 
successor of 2 is 0. 
A valuation in a standard interpretation I is a function v which assigns elements of, relations on, 
or functions over the domain to each of the individual, predicate and function variables. More 
precisely 
·Individual variables: an element of I I I is assigned to each individual variable X;, 
namely v(x;) 
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·Predicate variables: an n-ary relation on I I I is assigned to each n-ary predicate 
variable <I>;, namely v(<I>;) 
·Function variables: an n-ary function from I I I n to I I I is assigned to each n-ary 
function variable </>;, namely v( <!>;). 
Note that there are many possible valuations for any interpretation. 
Given a valuation v in an interpretation I we define the term-value function v from the set of 
terms to the domain of I as follows: 
· v(c;) = c/, for every individual constant C; 
· v(x;) = v(x;), for every individual variable X; 
· v(f;(t1, •• ,tJ) = f;1(v(t1), •• ,v(tJ), for every function constant/;, where t1, .. ,tn are terms of 
the language 
· v(</>;(tw.,t,J) = v(</>;)(v(t;), .. ,v(t,J), for every function variable</>;, where t1, •• ,tn are terms 
of the language. 
A valuation v is said to satisfy a wff in an interpretation I under the following conditions: 
·if a is an atomic formula, i.e. either Pit1, .. ,tJ or <l>it1, •• ,tJ, then v satisfies a iff then-
tuple (v(t1), •• ,v(tJ} is in the relation Pk1 or v(<l>k), respectively 
· v satisfies (--, (3) iff v does not satisfy (3 
· v satisfies (a -+ (3) iff v does not satisfy a or v satisfies (3 
· v satisfies (a /\ (3) iff v satisfies a and v satisfies (3 
· v satisfies (a v (3) iff v satisfies a or v satisfies (3 or both 
· v satisfies (a - (3) iff v satisfies both a and (3 or neither a nor (3 
· v satisfies vX({3), where X is any individual, predicate or function variable, iff every 
valuation v' which differs from v at most in the value it assigns to X satisfies (3 
· v satisfies 3X({3), where Xis any individual, predicate or function variable, iff there is 
some valuation v' which differs from v at most in the value it assigns to X which 
satisfies {3. 
A wff is true in an interpretation I iff it is satisfied by all possible valuations in I. A wff is false in 
an interpretation I iff it is not satisfied by any valuations in I. A wff is logically valid iff it is true 
in every interpretation. A wff is contradictory iff it is false in every interpretation. 
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Given a set of wffs A then a standard interpretation M is called a standard model of A iff all wffs 
of A are true under the interpretation M. A is said to be satisfiable iff it has a standard model, 
otherwise it is unsatisfiable. 
If A is a set of wffs and a is a single wff, then A semantically entails a with respect to the 
standard semantics iff every valuation in every standard model of A satisfies a with respect to the 
standard semantics. We write A f: a to indicate that A semantically entails a. We write f: a iff a 
is true in every standard interpretation. Just as in the case of first-order logic, f: is monotonic. 
The interpretation I given above is a model of the Peano axioms. It is easy to see that the 
first two axioms are true in I. The third axiom states that any subset of the domain which 
contains 0 and is closed under the successor function must contain all objects in the 
domain. This axiom is true in I - recall that N is the smallest set containing 0 and closed 
under the formation of successors. 
The interpretation J is not a model of the axioms, since the first axiom is false in J. To 
see this, note that 0 is the successor of 2 in J. 
Consider the interpretation J' of the same set of axioms: 
I J' I = JR+ (the set of non-negative reals) 
c1' = 0 
= 
1
' is the identity relation on JR+ 
succ1' is the function which maps every element x of ~+ to x + 1 
J' is not a model of the set of axioms, since the last axiom is not true in J'. This is 
because {0,1,2, .. } is a subset of JR+ which is closed under the successor function but which 
is not equal to JR+. 
Note furthermore that J' is a model of the first two axioms. The class of models of the 
first two axioms is thus larger than the class comprising the models of all three axioms. 
This illustrates that axioms have the effect of incrementally reducing the size of the class 
of models. 
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Soundness, completeness and consistency or first- and second-order logic 
We now give some important theorems (without proof) concerning what we may hope to achieve 
with theorem-proving algorithms for first- and second-order logic. For a more detailed exposition 
of the various types of theorem-proving algorithms for first-order logic, see [Genesereth & 
Nilsson 1988]. For a discussion of restrictions on second-order theorem-provers and alternatives 
to the standard semantics, see [Enderton 1972] and [Shapiro 1991]. 
By a theorem-proving algorithm (or deductive system) we understand an algorithm that uses 
rewriting rules (i.e. syntactic transformations on strings of the language) to establish connections 
between formulas. A theorem-proving algorithm is said to be sound iff every wff which can be 
deduced by it from a set of axioms is semantically entailed by the set of axioms. A theorem-
proving algorithm is said to be complete iff every wff which is entailed by a set of axioms can be 
deduced from the set of axioms by the algorithm. (We write A ~0 a if the wff a can be deduced 
by algorithm D from the set of axioms A). 
Theorem 1.1 (Soundness and completeness of first-order logic) 
There exists a theorem-proving algorithm D such that for any set A of first-order axioms and any 
wff a 
If A ~0 a then A f= a (Soundness) 
If A f= a then A ~0 a (Completeness) . 
• 
Remark: There are many sound and complete theorem-proving algorithms for first-order logic, 
ranging from Hilbert-style systems that employ rules like Modus Ponens to refutation-style 
systems that use Robinson's resolution rule. 
Given a sound and complete theorem-proving algorithm D, a set of axioms A is said to be 
consistent iff there is a wff a such that a cannot be deduced from A by D. 
Theorem 1.2 (Consistency and satisfiability of first-order logic) 
A first-order set of axioms is consistent iff it is satisfiable . 
• 
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This means that all that is needed to show that a first-order set of axioms is consistent, is a model 
of its axioms. 
Things are not so good for second-order logic, however. 
Theorem 1.3 (Soundness of second-order logic) 
There exists a theorem-proving algorithm D such that for any set A of second-order axioms and 
any wff a, A f-0 a implies that A f: a . 
• 
One of the most important limitations of the standard semantics for second-order logic, however, 
is 
Theorem 1.4 (Incompleteness of second-order logic) 
No theorem-proving algorithm that is sound with respect to the standard semantics for second-
order logic, is complete. In other words, A f: a does not imply that A f-0 a . 
• 
Corollary 1.4 
In second-order logic (with the standard semantics) the semantic notion of satisfiability lacks a 
syntactic analogue (i.e. there is no equivalent notion of consistency, as there is in the case of first-
order logic) . 
• 
In view of Theorem 1.4, it is sometimes preferable to employ an alternative to the standard 
semantics for second-order logic. We take up this matter in Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CIRCUMSCRIPTION 
Suppose we represent our knowledge of some system in a first-order language. If the constants 
have been selected in a sensible way, there will be, among the many possible interpretations of the 
language, at least one that bears a close resemblance to the system of interest. This we call the 
intended interpretation. The purpose of the axioms that represent our knowledge of the system is 
to select, from the class of all interpretations, a (hopefully much smaller) subclass of models 
which contains the intended interpretation and, preferably, nothing else. In general, however, it is 
difficult (and in some cases impossible) to incorporate sufficient knowledge about a system to get 
rid of all unwanted models, i.e. to give a complete axiomatisation of the system. 
One of the earliest attempts to devise a general method for completing a set of axioms involved 
the closed world assumption [Reiter 1978]. The closed world assumption is a meta-theoretical 
postulate to the effect that the denotations of all predicate constants should be as small as possible. 
As an example of the application of the closed world assumption, consider a database used by an 
airline booking system. 
In the database, we wish to represent facts about which cities the airline provides flights between 
(connections). This can be achieved by a first-order language consisting of individual constants 
representing all the relevant cities and a 2-ary predicate constant IsConnectedTo. For instance, the 
atom IsConnectedTo(London,NewYork) would be included in the set of axioms (call it DB, for 
database) to indicate that the airline provides a flight between London and New York. 
A query on the database is answered by determining whether a wff representing the query is 
entailed by the set of axioms. For instance, the query of whether Paris is connected to Quebec 
would consist of determining whether DB f= IsConnectedTo(Paris,Quebec). 
However, a problem arises when no specific atom is included in the database representing the 
connection being queried, e.g. if IsConnectedTo(Paris,Quebec) is not includec;l in the set of 
axioms. In such a case, neither IsConnectedTo(Paris,Quebec) nor its negation is entailed by DB 
because there are some models of DB which include the ordered pair (PARIS,QUEBEC) in the 
denotation of IsConnectedTo and there are models which do not. 
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The closed world assumption is the assumption that DB contains all relevant knowledge about the 
connections that exist, so that the query whether Paris is connected to Quebec should in this case 
be answered negatively. In effect, the closed world assumption excludes all the models of DB 
having denotations of the predicate constant IsConnectedTo that are larger than absolutely 
necessary. In fact, subject to certain mild restrictions (namely that DB consist of definite Horn 
clauses) the closed world assumption excludes all except a unique model (known as the least 
Herb rand model). 
Circumscription may be viewed as a generalisation of the closed world assumption, which allows 
us to focus on some rather than all of the predicate constants. 
Circumscription achieves this by adding new axioms which talk about alternative ways to interpret 
selected predicate constants. In fact, a variety of circumscriptive techniques have been developed, 
each of which has its own distinctive way of selecting out a class of 'minimal' models, i.e. models 
in which the denotations of one or more predicate constants are 'minimised'. The key to all these 
techniques is to use wffs of the form vx(P(x) - Q(x)) to express the idea that the denotation of P 
is a subset (not necessarily proper) of the denotation of Q. It will be convenient to introduce a 
special notation to abbreviate sequences of such wffs. 
Notation Tuples of predicate constants or variables are indicated in boldface. For example, P 
represents the tuple of predicate constants (P1, .. ,Pn) and cJ> represents the tuple of predicate 
variables ( cJ>1, .. , cJ>m). 
Let P and Q be two arbitrary predicate constants or variables (for simplicity, let them be unary) 
and let x be an arbitrary individual variable: 
vx(P(x) - Q(x)) is abbreviated to P :::;; Q 
and 
(P :::;; Q) /\ •(Q :::;; P) is abbreviated to P < Q. 
Similarly for two n-tuples of predicate constants or variables P and Q: 
Vx(P1(x) - Q1(x)) /\ .. /\ vx(Pn(x) - Qn(x)) is abbreviated to P :::;; Q 
and 
(P :::;; Q) /\ •(Q :::;; P) is abbreviated to P < Q . 
• 
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In subsequent sections we shall explore increasingly powerful forms of circumscription. The 
particular application that we have in mind for each of these forms of circumscription is to 
formalise the kind of common-sense reasoning that employs default rules of the form "Normally, 
such and such is the case". Probably the most famous example found in texts on common-sense 
reasoning is one about a bird called Tweety. Using the fact that normally birds can fly, we wish 
to be able to 'infer' (more in the sense of making a plausible conjecture than a logical deduction) 
that Tweety can fly. A set of axioms (call the set A) representing our knowledge is 
Bird(Tweety) 
'<lx(Bird(x) /I. •Ab(x) -+ Flies(x)) 
(The predicate constant Ab, representing the predicate 'is abnormal',· was first introduced by 
McCarthy [1980] as a device that would enable one to represent rules of the form "normally such 
and such is the case" in the formal language.) 
The first thing to note about the set of axioms A is that, as it stands, it does not entail the wff 
Flies(Tweety) since no statement affirming or denying Tweety's abnormality is included in A. In 
accordance with the intuition that most birds are normal, and that one should regard an entity as 
being abnormal only if forced to do so, one may decide to discard all models of A except those in 
which the denotation of Ab is minimal. Circumscription embodies the attempt to achieve the 
exclusion of unwanted models in a syntactic way (by adding certain new axioms to A). 
Circumscription will achieve our goal of formalising the 'inference' that Tweety can fly if it 
eliminates all models of A except those in which Tweety is normal, for then Flies(Tweety) is true 
in each remaining model. In other words, the circumscription of Ab will achieve our goal if the 
resulting expanded set of axioms, denoted by CIRC(A;Ab), entails Flies(Tweety). 
Of course, one could eliminate all the undesirable models quite straightforwardly by simply adding 
the wff •Ab(Tweety) to the original set of axioms. But then Flies(Tweety) is classically entailed by 
our axioms which means that it may be asserted as definite knowledge. While the axioms from 
which we begin represent our definite knowledge, circumscription is intended to lead us some 
distance beyond what is definite, namely to plausible conjectures. For instance, it is a plausible 
conjecture that Tweety can fly, since there is no information to the contrary and the greater 
proportion of birds do fly. There is a subtle but important difference between knowing that 
Tweety is a normal bird (and hence a flying bird) and making a plausible conjecture to this effect. 
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Wffs entailed by CIRC(A;Ab) but not by A represent these plausible conjectures. 
The second thing to note is that this type of common-sense reasoning is non-monotonic. In other 
· words, plausible conjectures which are made by common-sense reasoning might have to be 
retracted in the light of new information. For example, if an axiom were added affirming the 
abnormality of Tweety, i.e. Ab(Tweety), the circumscription of Ab would (once again) select out 
the models in which the denotation of Ab is as small as possible. In this case, every such model 
would have to include the denotation of Tweety in the denotation of Ab, and in such models there 
is no need for the denotation of Tweety to be in Flies. In other words, a conjecture (namely 
Flies(Tweety)) that was plausible with regard to the set of axioms A (plausible in the sense that 
Flies(Tweety) was entailed by CIRC(A;Ab)) is not plausible with regard to the expanded set of 
axioms A U {Ab(Tweety)} because CIRC(A U {Ab(Tweety)};Ab) does not entail Flies(Tweety). 
Naive circumscription 
We begin by describing a form of circumscription, which we call naive circumscription, for which 
the reader will search the literature in vain. We have invented the concept because it enables us to 
see the principle forms of circumscription as variations on a single theme. 
Definition Suppose that A is a finite set of axioms in a first-order language and Pis the tuple of 
predicate constants (P1, .. ,Pn). The naive circumscription of Pin A, denoted by CIRC(A;P), is the 
second-order formula 
A /\ •34>(A[4>] /\ 4> < P) 
where 4> is an n-tuple of predicate variables (4>1, .. ,cl>n) whose arities correspond to those of the 
predicate constants in P and A[4>] is the formula obtained from A by substituting cl>1, .. ,cl>n for 
P1, .. ,Pn in A. Thus CIRC(A;P) is the conjunction of the original set of axioms A and the 
circumscription axiom •34>(A[4>] /\ 4> < P) . 
• 
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If we only circumscribe a single predicate P in a set of axioms A the naive circumscription of P 
in A is 
A /\ •3~(A[~] /\ ~ < P) 
where -Ii is a predicate variable of the same arity as the predicate constant P. 
Expressed intuitively, this states that the denotation of P is as small as possible; i.e. the denotation 
of P satisfies A but there is no proper subset of the denotation of P which satisfies A. 
In the full definition of naive circumscription given above, the circumscription axiom is 
represented by -, 34>( A[ 4>] /\ 4> < P). In view of the equivalence between 3~( a) and -, V~(-, a), 
the circumscription axiom can be rewritten as 
V4>((A[cl>] /\ 4> ::;; P)-+ P ::;; 4>). 
This form of the circumscription axiom is used in many of the examples and theorems which 
follow. 
Say we have a (simplified) blocks world consisting of two blocks which can be stacked on 
each other. Suppose we want to describe the situation(s) in which a certain block is red 
and it is stacked on top of another block. A language for such a blocks world should have 
separate individual constants representing the two blocks, say a and b, a unary predicate 
constant Red representing the colour property of a block and a binary predicate constant 
On representing the relation between two stacked blocks. A set of axioms, A, describing 
this system might be: 
Red(a) /\ On(a,b) 
If we want to limit ourselves to models of A in which only a is red, we could either add 
the axiom vx(Red(x)-+ x = a) or we could use circumscription to circumscribe the 
predicate constant Red. The benefit of the latter is that in complex situations in which we 
don't know exactly how few objects must have the property Red, just that it should be as 
few as possible, the first option does not work but circumscription does. 
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CIRC(A;Red) is given by 
Red(a) fl. On(a,b) fl. •3~(~(a) fl. On(a,b) fl. ~ < Red) 
Expressed intuitively, this states that the denotation of a is a member of the denotation of 
Red, the denotation of On contains the ordered pair of objects denoted by a and b 
respectively, and that there is no proper subset of the denotation of Red that contains the 
object denoted by a. 
We now show that there are interpretations of the language which are models of the set of 
axioms, A, but which are not models of CIRC(A;Red). 
Say I is the following interpretation: 
I I I = {BLOCKA,BLOCKB} 
a1 = BLOCK.A, b1 = BLOCKB 
Reff = {BLOCKA,BLOCKB} 
On1 = { (BLOCKA,BLOCKB)}. 
A is true in I because a1 E Red1 and (a1,~) E On1, i.e. I is a model of A. 
We rewrite CIRC(A;Red) in expanded form: 
Red(a) fl. On(a,b) fl. v~((~(a) fl. On(a,b) fl. vx(~(x) -+ Red(x))) -+ vx(Red(x) -+ ~(x))) 
To show that I is not a model of CIRC(A;Red), we show that the wff vx(Red(x)-+ x = a) 
is true in every model of CIRC(A;Red). (This wff is clearly false in I, so if the wff is 
entailed by CIRC(A;Red), I cannot be a model of CIRC(A;Red)). 
Let M be any model of CIRC(A;Red). We wish to show that any valuation in M, say v, 
satisfies vx(Red(x) -+ x = a). This will be the case if every valuation in M which differs 
from v at most in the value it assigns to x, satisfies Red(x) -+ x = a. Let w be such a 
valuation in M, but assume that w does not satisfy Red(x)-+ x = a, i.e. w satisfies Red(x) 
but it does not satisfy x = a, or in other words, w(x) E RetfA and w(x) ;e aM. 
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We know that w satisfies CIRC(A;Red) and sow also satisfies the circumscription axiom. 
So any valuation which differs from w at most on cl> will satisfy (cl>(a) /\ On(a,b) /\ 
vx(cl>(x) -+ Red(x))) -+ vx(Red(x) -+ cl>(x)). Let u be the valuation which differs from w only 
in as much as u(cl>) = ReifA - {w(x)}. Then u satisfies cl>(a) since aM E ReifA and aM ;C 
w(x). Also u satisfies vx(cl>(x) -+ Red(x)). Hence u must satisfy vx(Red(x) -+ cl>(x)). So any 
valuation differing from u at most on x must satisfy Red(x) -+ cl>(x): But u itself is such a 
valuation. In particular then, it must be the case that if u(x) E ReifA then u(x) E u(cl>). 
But u(x) = w(x) (since u differs from w only in the value it assigns to cl>), and w(x) E 
Reit1. Therefore u(x) E u(cl>), contradicting the choice of u. Hence we reject the 
assumption that w(x) ;C ~. So w must satisfy Red(x) -+ x = a. 
The above example shows that circumscribing a predicate P in a set of axioms has the effect of 
discarding some of the models of the original set of axioms, namely all except those models that 
have the fewest possible individuals that satisfy P. In order to make the phrase "the fewest 
possible" precise, we need the notion of P-minimality. 
Definition Let A be a finite set of axioms and Pa tuple of predicate constants (Pz, .. ,Pn). Suppose 
M and N are models of A, then M is a P-submodel of N, written M s; P N, iff 
IM I = I NI 
~ = }(!/ for every function constant or predicate constant K not in P 
~ ~ }(!/ for every predicate constant K in P. 
M is a P-minimal model of A iff every P-submodel of M is identical to M (in other words, iff M 
is minimal in the usual sense, relative to the partial order s; r, of having no proper submodels) . 
• 
The theorem below shows that naive circumscription does in fact reduce the class of models of a 
set of axioms to precisely the class of minimal models. In other words, all P-minimal models of A 
are models of CIRC(A;P) and vice versa. 
Theorem 2.1 
Let A be any finite set of axioms of a first-order language. Suppose that Pis a tuple of predicate 
constants and let M be a model of A. 
Then Mis a model of CIRC(A;P) iff M is a P-minimal model of A. 
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Proof 
Without loss of generality we consider the naive circumscription of a single predicate P (rather 
than a tuple of predicates) in a set of axioms, A. 
(<=part) Assume that there is a P-minimal model M of A which is not a model of CIRC(A;P). 
Since M is a model of A, all the axioms of A are true in M. Consequently, the circumscription 
axiom, namely 
•3<P(A[<P] /\ <P < P) 
cannot be true in M, otherwise M would be a model of CIRC(A;P). There must therefore be.some 
valuation in M which does not satisfy the circumscription axiom. In other words, there must be 
some valuation, say v, that satisfies A[<P] /\ <P < P, and hence a subset of I M I n (where n is 
the arity of P), namely v(<P), which is a proper subset of P'1 and which is such that if P were 
reinterpreted as precisely v(<P) while all other constants are interpreted as in M, then the resulting 
interpretation would still be a model of the set of axioms, A. 
More precisely, let N be the interpretation constructed as follows: 
IN I = IM I 
[(N = j(M 
pN = V(<P). 
for every function or predicate constant K other than P 
Since the valuation v satisfies A(<I>) and pN = v(<I>), N is a model of A. Furthermore, N ~PM, 
by construction. However, N .,r. M because pN = v(<P) and P'1 .,r. v(<P). This contradicts the 
assumption that M is a P-minimal model of A. 
(=>part) Assume, on the other hand, that there is a model M of CIRC(A;P) which is not a P-
minimal model of A. Since M is not a P-minimal model, there must be another model of A, say 
M', such that I M' I = I M I , J(M' = J(M for every function or predicate constant K other than 
P, and ?'1' c P'1 (i.e. ?'1' is a proper subset of ?'1). However, this means that M cannot be a 
model of the circumscription of Pin A, namely A /\ •3<P(A[<P] /\ <P < P), which states that no 
proper subset of P'1 exists which satisfies A. To see this, let v be any valuation in M such that 
v(<I>) = ?'1'. Then v satisfies A[<P] /\ <I> < P and therefore fails to satisfy •3<l>(A[<P] /\ <P < P) . 
• 
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Remark: The 'if part of the above proof is based on the proof of Theorem 6.6 in [Lukaszewicz 
1990] which in turn is based on the sketchy proof in [McCarthy 1980]. 
Corollary 2.1 
If a set of axioms, A, has no P-minimal models, then CIRC(A,P) is not satisfiable (i.e. it has no 
models). In other words, naive circumscription does not necessarily preserve satisfiability - it 
depends on whether A has P-minimal models or not . 
• 
This corollary states a serious weakness of naive circumscription, since there are satisfiable sets of 
axioms which have no minimal models. This is shown in the following example [Etherington, 
Mercer & Reiter 1985]: 
Suppose that A is the set of axioms 
3.X(P(x) A vy(P(y) -+ •(x 
vx(P(x)-+ P(s(x))) 
vxy(s(x) = s(y)-+ x y) 
s(y)))) 
Consider an interpretation, M, where I M I = N = {O, 1,2, ... }, pvt = N and SA is the 
successor function on N. M is a model of A, so A is satisfiable. 
Let R be any model of A and let bR be any member of PR. By the second axiom of A, pR 
must also contain sR(bR), sR(sR(bR)), sR(sR(sR(bR))), etc., and by the third axiom these are 
all distinct. In other words, the denotation of P in any model of A contains an infinite 
sequence of elements (in effect, a copy of N). 
No matter what model R is, a P-submodel of R can be constructed by leaving out a finite 
initial sequence of the denotation of P. For instance, from M we may construct a new 
model of A, say M', by taking pvt' to be the subset N+ = {l,2,3, ... }. Therefore every 
model of A has at least one proper P-submodel and consequently A has no P-minimal 
models. 
Therefore, by Corollary 2.1, CIRC(A;P) is not satisfiable. 
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If, however, we restrict our attention to sets of axioms which do have minimal models (the so-
called well-founded sets of axioms), naive circumscription does preserve satisfiability. The notion 
of well-foundedness is interesting because analogous ideas are to be found in the theories of 
deductive databases and logic programming - see [Apt, Blair & Walker 1988]. 
Definition Suppose A is a finite set of axioms and Pis a tuple of predicate constants. A is well-
founded with respect to P iff each model of A has a P-minimal submodel. A set of axioms A is 
well-founded iff A is well-founded with respect to every P . 
• 
Theorem 2.2 (Preservation of satisfiability for well-founded theories) 
Suppose that a set of axioms, A, is satisfiable. if A is well-founded with respect to a tuple of 
predicate constants P, then CIRC(A,P) is satisfiable. 
Proof 
If A is satisfiable, then it has a model, say M. Furthermore, if A is well-founded with respect to a 
tuple of predicate constants P, then M has a P-minimal submodel, say N. By Theorem 2.1, N is 
also a model of CIRC(A;P), therefore CIRC(A;P) is satisfiable . 
• 
No syntactic characterisation of well-foundedness is known. In other words, the definition of well-
foundedness is not very functional in the sense that there is no known means of syntactic 
inspection by which to decide whether an arbitrary set of axioms is well-founded or not. There 
are, however, procedures to decide whether a set of axioms is universal. 
Definition A finite set of first-order axioms is universal iff it is logically equivalent to a wff that 
consists of a prefix comprising zero, one or more universal quantifiers followed by a quantifier-
free wff . 
• 
Following Lifschitz [1986], a larger class of wffs called the almost-universal wffs, for which it is 
also possible to determine membership algorithmically, can be defined as follows: 
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Definition A finite set of first-order axioms is almost-universal with respect to a tuple P of 
predicate constants iff it is logically equivalent to a wff that consists of a prefix comprising zero, 
one or more universal quantifiers followed by a wff whose unnegated atomic formulae involving 
predicate constants in P do not contain variables that fall in the scope of any quantifiers other than 
those in the prefix . 
• 
Clearly, all universal sets of axioms are also almost-universal with respect to any P. 
Theorem 2.3 [Lifschitz 1986] 
All sets of axioms which are almost-universal with respect to a tuple of predicate constants Pare 
well-founded with respect to P. 
Proof 
Suppose A is a set of axioms which is almost-universal with respect to a tuple of predicate 
constants P. If A is not satisfiable then A is (trivially) well-founded since every model of A (of 
which none exist) has a P-minimal submodel. 
So let A be a satisfiable set of axioms which is almost-universal with respect to an n-ary predicate 
constant P. (We consider a single predicate constant Prather than a tuple of predicate constants, 
for the sake of simplicity). Let M be a model of A. 
Let SUBP(A,M) be the set of all models of A which are P-submodels of M. We will use Zorn's 
lemma to show that M has a minimal submodel. Let L be any subset of SUBP(A,M) such that Lis 
linearly ordered with respect to P (i.e. for any two distinct models in L, the denotation of P in 
one of them is a proper subset of the denotation of Pin the other). 
Let M' be the interpretation defined by 
IM' I =IM I 
J<!A' = K!'1 for all constants K besides the predicate constant P 
pM' = n pN. 
NEL 
We now wish to show that M' is a lower bound of L. The first step is to show that M' is model 
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of A. A is almost-universal with respect to P, so it is equivalent to a conjunction of wffs of the 
form 
'v'XI .. Xm(N V P(ti) V .. V P(tk)) 
where N is a wff not containing any unnegated atoms involving P whose free variables are in 
x1, .. ,Xm, and ti, .. ,tk are n-tuples of terms containing no variables beside x1, .. ,xm. (Since A is of the 
form 'v'XI..Xm(a), the reformulation of A is achieved by applying a standard algorithm for writing 
propositions in conjunctive normal form to a). 
Let v be any valuation in M' and let N v P(t1) v .. v P(tk) be the unquantified part of one of 
the conjuncts of A, such that v does not satisfy any of P(t1), .. ,P(tk). (Note that if no such wff 
exists then M' is immediately a model of A). 
Since, by construction, the denotation of P in M' is the intersection of the denotations of P in all 
the models in L, there must be, for every i = 1 .. k, a model Mi in L such that P(ti) is not satisfied 
by v in Mi. (Note that v is a valuation in all of the models in L, since the domain of M' is 
identical to the domain of each of the models in L). Since Lis linearly ordered with respect to the 
denotation of P, {M1, .. ,Mk} is also linearly ordered with respect to P, and since {M1, .. ,Mk} is a 
finite subset of L, one of Mi..Mk must be the "smallest" with respect to its denotation of P, say 
Ms. By the choice of Mi. .Mk, none of P(ti) are satisfied by v in Ms. Since Ms is a model of A, N 
must be satisfied by v in Ms. Since the only occurrences of Pin N are negated atoms, and pM' ~ 
pMs, N must be satisfied by v in M'. 
Therefore M' is a model of A. Moreover, by construction M' is a P-submodel of every model of 
L. 
Zorn's lemma states that if a lower bound can be found for every linearly ordered subset of a 
given set, the set itself has a minimal element. We have shown that, for every linearly ordered 
subset L of SUBP(A,M), we can find a model of A, namely M', such that M' is a P-submodel of 
every model in L. Therefore a P-minimal model of A exists. Since A has a P-minimal model, it is 
well-founded with respect to P . 
• 
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Corollary 2.3 
Naive circumscription of a set of axioms which is almost-universal with respect to a tuple of 
predicate constants, preserves satisfiability . 
• 
Remark: The significance of this result resides in the fact that a finite set of clauses is a universal 
wff, and so the class of universal axioms includes logic programs and deductive databases. 
The preservation of satisfiability is a problem for all forms of circumscription. A particular 
weakness of naive circumscription is its lack of expressive power. We measure the expressive 
power of circumscription by the new ground atoms entailed by CIRC(A;P) but not by A. Consider 
firstly the case of a ground atom involving a circumscribed predicate constant. 
Theorem 2.4 
Suppose that a finite set of axioms A is well-founded, P E P is an n-ary predicate constant and t 
is an n-tuple of ground terms, then 
CIRC(A;P) F P(t) iff A F P(t). 
Proof [Etherington, Mercer & Reiter 1985] 
If A f= P(t), then CIRC(A;P) f= P(t). This follows directly from the definition of CIRC(A;P). 
If CIRC(A;P) f= P(t), then A f= P(t), for if not, there is a model M of A in which P(t) is false, 
but whose P-minimal sub-models must, by Theorem 2.1, satisfy P(t). Suppose M' is a P-minimal 
sub-model of M. Then pM' ~ pM. If the n-tuple of objects denoted by t belongs to J1M, that same 
n-tuple will also belong to pM'. Hence if P(t) is true in M', P(t) will also be true in M, 
contradicting the choice of M. Therefore M has no P-minimal sub-model, contradicting the well-
foundedness of A . 
• 
This theorem states that no new ground atoms can be entailed by circumscribing the relevant 
predicate constant in a well-founded theory. This is not a very surprising result since 
circumscription of a predicate constant is meant to minimize its denotation in the models of the 
theory. More distressing is the following: 
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Theorem 2.5 
Suppose A is a well-founded set of axioms, Q <£. P is an n-ary predicate constant and t is an n-
tuple of ground terms, then 
(i) CIRC(A;P) F Q(t) iff A F Q(t) 
(ii) CIRC(A;P) F --, Q(t) iff A F --, Q(t). 
Proof [Etherington, Mercer & Reiter 1985] 
(i) If A f= Q(t) then CIRC(A;P) f= Q(t) follows directly from the definition of CIRC(A;P). 
Assume that Q(t) is not semantically entailed by A. Then there is a model of A, say M, in 
which Q(t) is false. Since A is well-founded, M has a P-minimal submode!, say M'. By 
the definition of a P-submodel, the interpretation of Q is the same in M and M', since Q 
. <£. P. Hence Q(t) is also false in M'. Then, by Theorem 2.1, Q(t) is not semantically 
entailed by CIRC(A;P). 
(ii) The proof is similar to (i) . 
• 
The above theorem states that no new plain or negated ground atoms involving uncircumscribed 
predicate constants can be entailed by naive circumscription of well-founded sets of axioms. This 
is a serious flaw, since it proves that naive circumscription is inadequate for the formulation of 
simple common-sense arguments. 
As an example, consider the set of axioms A given earlier for the Tweety problem: 
Bird(Tweety) 
vx(Bird(x) /\ •Ab(x) ~ Flies(x)) 
We want to be able to conjecture that Tweety can fly by circumscribing Ab in A, i.e. we 
want to show that CIRC(A;Ab) f= Flies(Tweety). 
However, Theorem 2.5 states that no new positive new ground instances of atomic 
formulae involving Flies can be derived by naively circumscribing Ab. 
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To analyse this problem, consider the following two models of A, namely M and N: 
I M I = {TWEETY} 
TweetyM = TWEETY 
Bir<f'1 = {TWEETY} 
AIJM = {} 
Flie~ = {TWEETY}, 
I N I = {TWEETY} 
TweetyN = TWEETY 
Birt!' = {TWEETY} 
AbN = {TWEETY} 
FliesN = {}. 
M and N are both models of A because all the axioms of A are true in both M and N. 
Furthermore, M and N are both Ab-minimal models of A because the denotation of Ab 
cannot be made any smaller in either of them without violating the axioms in A. M is an 
"intended" Ab-minimal model because, since there is no information stating that any 
objects are abnormal with regard to being able to fly, we want to entertain the possibility 
that there are none, i.e. that AIJM is empty. However, our definition of minimality (which 
we have shown in Theorem 2 .1 to be captured precisely by our definition of naive 
circumscription) also allows N to be an Ab-minimal model of A. Intuitively, one would 
imagine that one could construct a proper submodel N' of N simply by taking AbN' = {}. 
However, such a re-interpretation of Ab violates the second axiom unless Flies is also re-
interpreted, specifically as FliesN' = {TWEETY}. Our current version of minimality does 
not permit this: the interpretation of all constants other than Ab must remain fixed. 
The reader may feel that the model N (and indeed also the model M) is unnatural in that it 
has a domain containing the single member TWEETY. After all, it hardly makes sense to 
use rules of the form "Normally, such and such is the case" for domains containing just 
one object. One might wonder whether an alternative to allowing Flies to vary might be to 
add an axiom like 3.X( •(x = Tweety)) to the original set of axioms A. It is indeed quite 
reasonable to work with such a set of axioms. However, the conjecture Flies(Tweety) is 
still blocked - consider the minimal model N' with I N' I = {TWEETY,CHARLIE}, 
TweetyN' = TWEETY, BirdN' = {TWEETY,CHARLIE}, AbN' = {TWEETY} and FliesN 
= {CHARLIE}. In order to shrink AbN' it is still necessary to enlarge FliesN'. 
The above example suggests that we should allow the denotations of (some selected) predicate 
constants to vary in the process of minimisation so as to allow the denotation of the predicate 
constant(s) which are being circumscribed to really be as small as possible. This will require 
adaptations to our definition of circumscription as well as to our definition of minimality. 
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Circumscription allowing predicates to vary 
We now present a new formulation of circumscription to address the principal flaw of our first 
·definition of circumscription, namely that no new ground atoms involving uncircumscribed 
predicates are obtainable. This problem is overcome by allowing the denotations of some (other) 
predicate constants to vary in the process of minimisation. 
The new definition of circumscription is expressed, as before, as the conjunction of a second-
order circumscription axiom and a given set of first-order axioms: 
Definition Suppose that A is a finite set of axioms in a first-order language and the predicate 
constants in the tuples P = (P1, .. ,Pm) and Q = (Q1, .. ,Qn) are disjoint. The circumscription of Pin 
A allowing predicates Q to vary, denoted by CIRC(A;P;Q), is the second-order formula 
A A •34>V(A[4>,V] A 4> < P) 
where 4> is an m-tuple of predicate variables (cI>1, .. ,cI>m) whose arities correspond to those of the 
constants in P, v is an n-tuple of predicate variables ('1' 1, •• , '1' n) whose arities correspond to those 
of the constants in Q, and A[«I>,v] is the formula obtained by substituting cI>1, .. ,cI>m for P1, .. ,Pm 
and '1'1, .. , 'lrn for Ql, .. ,Qn in A. CIRC(A;P;Q) is therefore the conjunction of the original set of 
axioms A with the circumscription axiom •34>V(A[4>,v] A 4> < P) . 
• 
The circumscription axiom may equivalently be written as 
'v'«l>V((A[«l>,V] A 4> ~ P)-+ P ~ 4>). 
To describe the semantics of circumscription allowing predicates to vary, the previous definitions 
of submodels and minimality must be adapted slightly: 
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Definition Let A be a finite set of axioms and P and Q two disjoint tuples of predicate constants. 
Say Mand N are models of A, then Mis a P;Q-submodel of N, written M ~P;Q N, iff 
IM I =I NI 
K!'1 = K1", for every function constant K and predicate constant K not in P or Q 
i<!"' ~ ~, for every predicate constant K in P. 
We write M <P;Q N iff M ~P:Q N but not N ~P:Q M. 
Mis a P;Q-minimal model of A iff there is no model N such that N <P.·Q M . 
• 
It is interesting to note that if M and N differ only in their denotations of Q, M and N are both 
P;Q-submodels of one another but are not identical to one another, i.e. M ~P:Q N and N ~P:Q M 
but M ';t. N. In other words, the relation ~ P:Q is not necessarily antisymmetric, and therefore 
does not necessarily form a partial ordering on the set of models, but rather a pre-order, i.e. it is 
a reflexive, transitive relation. 
Like the previous definition of circumscription, the present version of circumscription also picks 
out precisely the minimal models of a set of axioms. Minimality just happens to have changed its 
meaning slightly. (The proof is analogous to Theorem 2.1.) 
Allowing the denotations of certain predicate constants to vary in the process of minimisation does 
not solve the problem of the preservation of satisfiability. More precisely, even if A is a 
satisfiable set of axioms, CIRC(A;P;Q) is not necessarily satisfiable. The problem is exactly the 
same as for the case where no predicates are allowed to vary. Since the models of CIRC(A;P;Q) 
are precisely the P;Q-minimal models, if we add the circumscription axiom to a set of axioms 
which has no minimal model, the resulting set of axioms will not have a model, i.e. it will be 
unsatisfiable. Since there are satisfiable sets of axioms which do not have a minimal model, 
circumscription does not preserve satisfiability in such cases. 
If, however, we confine ourselves to sets of axioms which do have minimal models, 
circumscription (allowing predicates to vary) does preserve satisfiability. The definition of well-
foundedness is adapted accordingly: 
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Definition Suppose A is a set of axioms and P and Q are two disjoint, finite tuples of predicate 
constants. A is well-founded with respect to P;Q iff each model of A has a P;Q-minimal 
submode!. A is well-founded iff A is well-founded with respect to every pair of finite tuples . 
• 
The example below shows that new ground atoms involving uncircumscribed predicates can be 
entailed by circumscription if the denotation of such predicate constants are allowed to vary in the 
process of minimisation. 
Say A is the set of axioms given previously for the Tweety example, namely: 
Bird(Tweety) 
vx(Bird(x) /\ •Ab(x) - Flies(x)) 
We would like to show that Tweety can fly by circumscribing Ab in A. We should allow 
Flies to vary, since the predicate constant Ab (whose denotation we wish to minimise) 
represents abnormality with regard to being able to fly. (In fact, the denotation of Ab is 
intended to be precisely the complement of the denotation of Flies. Hence it does not seem 
sensible to attempt to minimise Ab without recognising that the process should affect 
Flies). We therefore want to show that CIRC(A;Ab;Flies) I= Flies(Tweety). 
Consider all the Ab;Flies-minimal models of A. One such model is M: 
I M I = {TWEETY} 
TweetyM = TWEETY 
Birc/'1 = {TWEETY} 
AlJM = {} 
Flie/A = {TWEETY}. 
M is a model of A because all the axioms of A are true in M. M is a Ab;Flies-minimal 
model of A because no Ab;Flies-submodel of M can be found whose denotation of Ab is a 
proper subset of AlJM, since AlJM is already as small as it can be. 
The question is whether every Ab;Flies-minimal model of A must have the object denoted 
by Tweety in the denotation of Flies. Suppose there is an Ab;Flies-minimal model of A, 
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say N, which does not have the object denoted by Tweety in the denotation of Flies. Then 
AbN must contain the object denoted by Tweety, otherwise N would not satisfy the second 
axiom of A. But then we can form an interpretation N' from N by removing the object 
denoted by Tweety from the denotation of Ab and adding it to the denotation of Flies. We 
note that N' is a model of A because N is a model of A and N' is identical to N except 
for the denotations of Ab and Flies which differ only in that the object denoted by Tweety 
is a member of one and not the other, ensuring that both axioms of A are true in N'. 
More importantly, however, we note that N' is an Ab;Flies-submodel of N, since its 
domain is the same as that of N, the denotations of all its constants besides Ab and Flies 
are exactly the same as those of N. Furthermore, N is not an Ab;Flies-submodel of N' 
because its denotation of Ab is not a subset of the denotation of Ab in N'. This contradicts 
the assumption that N is an Ab;Flies-minimal model of A. 
So we see that every Ab;Flies-minimal model of A must have the object denoted by 
Tweety in the denotation of Flies. Since the Ab;Flies-minimal models of A are precisely 
the models of CIRC(A;Ab;Flies), we conclude that CIRC(A;Ab;Flies) f: Flies(Tweety). 
The following is another example of circumscribing an Ab predicate, but in this case, a 2-ary Ab 
predicate: 
Consider the default rule that, normally, we give gifts to friends on their birthdays. This 
can be expressed in the following wff: 
'i:lxy(Birthday(y) A Friend(x,y) A •Ab(x,y) - GivesGift(x,y)) 
If Anne's friend Alice has a birthday, can we use this rule to conjecture that Anne will 
give a gift to Alice? We firstly need to represent this further knowledge by means of 
axioms: 
Birthday(Alice) 
Friend(Anne,Alice) 
Naive circumscription of Ab in the set of axioms (call the set A) will not entail 
GivesGift(Anne,Alice), since Theorem 2.5 states that no new atoms involving 
uncircumscribed predicate constants can be entailed by naive circumscription. 
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We therefore allow GivesGift to vary while circumscribing Ab in A, not only to get 
around Theorem 2.5, but also because a change in the denotation of Ab may be expected 
to affect the denotation of Gives Gift. We therefore want to show that 
CIRC(A;Ab;GivesGift) I= GivesGift(Anne,Alice), or, in other words, that 
GivesGift(Anne,Alice) is true in every Ab;GivesGift-minimal model of A. 
Let M be an Ab;GivesGift-minimal model of A, and assume that GivesGift(Anne,Alice) is 
not true in M. 
Now construct the interpretation M' of A as follows: 
IM' I= IMI 
Alicr!'1' = Alicr!'1, Annr!'1' = Annr!'1 
Birthdif' = Birthdif, Frienifl"' = Frienifl" 
A!JM' = A!JM - { (Annr!'1,Alicr!'1)} 
GivesGijt1' = GivesGijt1 U { (Annr!'1,Alicr!'1)}. 
To see that M' is a model of A, consider just the first axiom (the other two axioms of A 
are patently true in M'). The denotations of Birthday and Friend are the same in M' as in 
M. We may therefore confine our attention to the possible violation of the axioms by the 
change to the denotations of Ab and GivesGift. The only problem which could occur by 
removing the ordered pair (Annr!'1,Alicr!'1) from the denotation of Ab is that this might 
allow valuations assigning Annr!'1 to x and Alicr!'1 to y to satisfy the antecedent of the 
(unquantified) axiom. However, even if this is the case, the ordered pair (Annr!'1,Alicr!'1) 
has been added to the denotation of GivesGift to ensure that the same valuation also 
satisfies the consequent of the axiom. 
Since the domains of M and M' are the same, as well as the denotations of all constants 
(besides Ab and GivesGift), and since A!JM' is a subset of AbM, M' is a Ab;GivesGift-
submodel of M. However, A!JM is not a subset of A!JM' (because the ordered pair 
(Annr!'1,Alicr!'1) must be in A!JM to satisfy the first axiom in M), M is not a Ab; GivesGift-
submodel of M', which contradicts the supposition that M is an Ab;GivesGift-minimal 
model of A. Therefore, GivesGift(Anne,Alice) must be true in every Ab;GivesGift-minimal 
model of A, i.e. CIRC(A;Ab;GivesGift) I= GivesGift(Anne,Alice). 
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The final examples illustrate circumstances in which more than one predicate is permitted to vary 
and in which more than one predicate is minimised simultaneously. 
Assume that birds normally fly and build nests and that we are interested in the 
capabilities of a bird called Tweety. Consider two alternative sets of axioms to represent 
this knowledge: 
A: vx(Bird(x) /\ •Ab1(x) -+ Flies(x)) 
vx(Bird(x) /\ •Afo(x)-+ BuildsNests(x)) 
Bird(Tweety) 
B: vx(Bird(x) /\ •Ab(x)-+ Flies(x) /\ BuildsNests(x)) 
Bird(Tweety) 
Suppose that we wish to formalise the common-sense inference that Tweety can fly. From 
the set of axioms A this can be achieved (as done previously) by forming 
CIRC(A;Ab1;Flies). From B, however, the same strategy does not work, i.e. it is not true 
that CIRC(B;Ab;Flies) I= Flies(Tweety). Consider the interpretation N of the language for 
B: 
I N I = {TWEETY} 
TweetyN = TWEETY 
Bir~ = {TWEETY} 
AbN = {TWEETY} 
FliesN = BuildsNestsN = {}. 
It is easy to confirm that N is a model of B. Furthermore, Flies(Tweety) is not true in N. 
We assert that N is a Ab;Flies-minimal model of B. To see this, assume the existence of a 
proper Ab;Flies-submodel of N, say N'. AbN' must be empty for N' to be a proper 
submodel of N, but the only way to prevent N' from violating the default axiom would be 
to remove TWEETY from Bir~· (which would violate the axiom Bird(Tweety)) or to add 
TWEETY to FliesN' and BuildsNestsN' (but we may not change the denotation of 
BuildsNests since the denotations of all constants besides Ab and Flies must be the same in 
N' as in N for N' to be a submodel of N). So the existence of a proper submodel of N is 
impossible, confirming that N is an Ab;Flies-minimal model of B. 
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The above examination of the existence of a model of B in which the denotation of Ab is 
empty suggests that BuildsNests should also be allowed to vary in the circumscription of 
Ab, i.e. to form CIRC(B;Ab;Flies,BuildsNests). This is not really surprising since the Ab 
predicate in B represents abnormality with regard to flying and building nests, so 
minimising the number of abnormal individuals can be expected to have an effect on the 
number of individuals that can fly and build nests. 
The reader will find it a useful exercise to check that CIRC(B;Ab;Flies,BuildsNests) p 
Flies(Tweety). 
Suppose that we now wish to formalise the common-sense argument that Tweety can fly 
and build nests. To do so from A, we need to circumscribe both Ab1 and Abz allowing 
Flies and BuildsNests to vary. To do so from B, we need to circumscribe Ab allowing 
Flies and BuildsNests to vary. We will show how it works in the case of A, i.e. we will 
show that CIRC(A;Abi,Abz;Flies,BuildNests) p Flies(Tweety) /\ BuildsNests(Tweety). 
Let M be any Abi,Abz;Flies,BuildNests-minimal model of A. Suppose, however, that 
Flies(Tweety) /\ BuildsNests(Tweety) is not true in M, i.e. that Tweeif fl. Fliet'I or 
Tweeif fl. BuildsNestsM. As a consequence, note that in order not to violate either of the 
default axioms of A, Tweeif must be in Ab1M or in Ab~. 
Now construct an interpretation M' of the language of A as follows: 
IM' I =IM I 
Tweeif' = Tweeif 
Bircf'1' = BirdN 
Abr = Ab1M - {Tweeif} 
AfoM' = Ab~ - {Tweeif} 
Fliet'I' = Fliet'I U {Tweeif} 
BuildsNestsM' = BuildsNestsM U {Tweeif}. 
To see that M' is a model of A, note that the denotation of Bird is the same in M' as in 
M. The only way that vx(Bird(x) /\ •Ab1(x) -+ Flies(x)) could be violated in M' would be 
for Fliet'I' to be a proper subset of Fliet'I (which is not the case) or for Ab1M' to be a 
proper subset of AbiM (which could be the case). Suppose Abr c Ab1M, i.e. that Tweeif 
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E Ab1M. Then M' still satisfies the axiom since TweetyM is added to the denotation of 
Flies. A similar argument shows that the axiom vx(Bird(x) A •Abi(x)-+ BuildsNests(x)) 
is also true in M'. Bird(Tweety) must also be true in M' since it is true in M and the 
denotations of Bird and Tweety are the same in M and M'. 
By construction, M' is an Ab1,Ab2;Flies,BuildNests-submodel of M, since Ab1M' s; AbiM 
and Ab2M' s; AbzM and the denotations of all other constants (besides Flies and 
BuildsNests) are the same. However, M is not an Ab1,Ab2;Flies,BuildNests-submodel of 
M', since both AbJM s; Ab1M' and AbzM s; Ab!"' cannot be true due to the fact that 
TweetyM must be in Ab1M or in Ab!" but is not in either of Ab1M' or Ab!"'. This contradicts 
the supposition that M is an Ab1,Abz;Flies,BuildNests-minimal model of A in which 
Flies(Tweety) A BuildsNests(Tweety) is not true. So CIRC(A;Ab1,Abz;Flies,BuildNests) f: 
Flies(Tweety) A BuildsNests(Tweety). 
We have seen in the examples above that circumscription allowing predicates to vary can give new 
ground atoms involving those predicate constants whose denotations are allowed to vary in the 
process of minimisation. However, no new (plain or negated) ground atoms involving 
uncircumscribed predicate constants whose denotations are not allowed to vary in the process of 
minimisation, can be reached, as shown in the following theorem. 
Theorem 2.6 
Let A be a finite set of axioms of a first-order language and P and Q two disjoint tuples of 
predicate constants, let R be a k-ary predicate constant not in P or Q and let t be a k-tuple of 
ground terms in the language. If A is well-founded with respect to P;Q then 
(i) CIRC(A;P;Q) F R(t) iff A F R(t) 
(ii) CIRC(A;P;Q) F •R(t) iff A F •R(t). 
Proof [Etherington 1988] 
The proof is essentially an alphabetic variant of Theorem 2.5, and is therefore not repeated . 
• 
However, new ground atoms involving uncircumscribed, unvarying predicates can be obtained if 
the denotations of other constants, specifically function constants, are allowed to vary in the 
process of minimisation. This brings us to the next formulation of circumscription. 
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Standard circumscription 
As a motivation for a further adaptation of our definition of circumscription, consider the 
following example due to Reiter [1980]: 
Bill is married and lives in Vancouver. Normally, spouses live in the same town. 
Common-sense would then suggest that Bill's wife also lives in Vancouver. A language in 
which to formalise this common-sense argument could contain individual constants Bill 
and Vancouver, and two function constants livesin and wife. (Strictly speaking, we should 
use a many-sorted language to avoid meaningless terms such as wife(Vancouver), but, in 
the interest of readability, we ignore the technical complications). The following axioms 
are a rather naive attempt to express the system in first-order logic: 
vx( •Ab(x) ~ livesin(x) = livesin(wife(x))) 
livesin(Bill) = Vancouver 
An example of an intended interpretation M is: 
IM I = {BILL,BILLSWIFE,VANCOUVER} 
Bilf'1 = BILL, Vancouve~ = VANCOUVER 
A!JM = {} 
= M is the identity relation on M 
livesinM(BILL) =VANCOUVER 
livesinM(BILLSWIFE) = VANCOUVER 
wijeM(BILL) = BILLSWIFE. 
It is clear that M is a model of the axioms. However, there are other models of this set of 
axi~ms in which Bill's wife does not live in Vancouver, for example, the interpretation N: 
I N I = {BILL,BILLSWIFE, v ANCOUVER,SASKA TOON} 
BillN = BILL, VancouverN = VANCOUVER 
AbN = {BILL} 
= N is the identity relation on N 
livesinN(BILL) = VANCOUVER 
livesinN(BILLSWIFE) = SASKA TOON 
wifeN(BILL) = BILLSWIFE. 
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This is the kind of model which circumscription is intended to eliminate. We therefore 
circumscribe Ab in the set of axioms. Since we don't have any information to say that Bill 
is abnormal with regard to where he and his wife live, the resulting axioms should entail 
that Bill's wife also lives in Vancouver. In other words, we form CIRC(A;Ab) so as to 
entail livesin(wife(Bill)) = Vancouver. However, Theorem 2.5 states that no new ground 
atoms involving uncircumscribed predicate constants (in this case = ) can be obtained by 
circumscription. We may consider allowing = to vary in the process of minimisation, i.e. 
by forming CIRC(A;Ab; = ). However, this would be counter-productive, since it would 
allow models where anything is equal to anything else. We specifically want the 
denotation of = to be the identity relation on the domain. 
The most obvious solution is to allow the denotation of the function constant livesin to 
vary in the process of minimisation, i.e. by forming CIRC(A;Ab;livesin). This is a 
reasonable thing to do since the Ab predicate constant is intended to apply to those 
individuals who do not live in the same city as their wives. Consequently, reducing the 
number of abnormal individuals implicitly influences the function livesin. 
To make the need for this innovation even clearer, here is another example: 
Consider the default rule that the biological father of a brother and sister are normally the 
same person: 
vxy(Siblings(x,y) A •Ab(x,y)--+ fatherofix) = fatherof(y)) 
vxy(Siblings(x,y)--+ Siblings(y,x)) 
(The second axiom is included to cut out a class of nonsense models.) 
Say we want to use this default rule to be able to conjecture that James, who is the father 
of Jack, is also the father of Jack's sister Jill. To do this we first need to add some axioms 
affirming the necessary relationships, forming the complete set of axibms A: 
Siblings(Jack,Jill) 
fatherofiJack) = James 
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We might hope that the desired result could be achieved by circumscribing the predicate 
constant Ab in A, i.e. that CIRC(A;Ab) f= fatherof(Jill) = James. However, an Ab-
minimal model of A can be constructed with some other object (eg. JOE) playing the role 
of Jill's father. (This model must necessarily have (JACK,JILL) in the denotation of Ab.) 
Once again, allowing the denotation of = to vary would be counter-productive. 
Since the Ab predicate constant is specifically meant to represent "abnormality with 
respect to having the same father", the most obvious solution is to allow the denotation of 
the function constantfatherof to vary in the process of minimisation, i.e. by forming 
CIRC(A;Abjatherof). 
Instead of only allowing the denotation of certain predicate constants to vary in the process of 
minimisation, we therefore also wish to allow the denotations of selected junction constants to 
vary (and, since individual constants may be viewed as 0-ary function constants, it follows that we 
will permit the denotations of individual constants to vary as well). The idea is due to Lifschitz, 
who in [1985) called this form 'second-order parallel circumscription'. We shall refer to it as 
standard circumscription. 
The definition of standard circumscription is expressed, once again, as the conjunction of a 
second-order circumscription axiom and a given set of axioms. 
Definition Suppose that A is a finite set of axioms in a first-order language, P = (P1, .. ,Pm) is a 
tuple of predicate constants and S = (S1, .. ,Sn) is a tuple of individual, predicate or function 
constants disjoint from P. The circumscription of Pin A allowing the constants S to vary, denoted 
by CIRC(A;P;S), is the second-order formula 
A /\ -.3cf>X(A[«l>,X] /\ cl> < P) 
where cl> is an m-tuple of predicate variables ( cf?1, •• , cf?m) whose arities correspond to those of the 
constants in P, Xis an n-tuple of individual, predicate or function variables (X1, .. ,Xn} similar to 
S1, .. ,Sn, and A[cl>,X] is the formula obtained by substituting cf?1, .. ,cf?m for P1, .. ,Pm and X1, .. ,Xn for 
S1, .. ,Sn in A. CIRC(A;P;S) is therefore the conjunction of the original set of axioms A with the 
circumscription axiom -.3cf>X(A[cl>,X] /\ cl> < P) . 
• 
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To describe the semantics of standard circumscription, the definition of minimality must be 
adapted accordingly. 
Definition Let A be a finite set of axioms, P a tuple of predicate constants and S a tuple of 
individual, predicate or function constants. Suppose M and N are models of A, then M is a P;S-
submodel of N, written M ::;;; P:s N, iff 
IM I =IN I 
f<'v1 = K', for every (individual, function or predicate) constant Knot in P or S 
f<'v1 ~ K', for every predicate constant K in P. 
We write M <P:s N iff M :s;;P:s N but not N :s;;P:s M. 
Mis a P;S-minimal model of A iff there is no model N such that N <P:s M . 
• 
Like the previous versions of circumscription, the latest version also picks out precisely the 
corresponding minimal models. (The proof of this is analogous to that of Theorem 2.1.) This fact 
can be used to show that circumscription with varying function constants does support the desired 
conjectures in the above examples: 
To show that CIRC(A;Ab;livesin) f= livesin(wife(Bill)) = Vancouver, consider the 
Ab;livesin-minimal models of A. Suppose M to be any Ab;livesin-minimal model of A and 
assume that livesinM(BILLSWIFE) = SASKATOON (or any object in the domain besides 
the denotation of Vancouver). For M to be a model of A, the denotation of Bill must be in 
the denotation of Ab. 
Construct an interpretation N as follows: 
I NI = IMI 
BillN = Bil/Mand VancouverN = Vancouve~ 
AbN = {} 
wijeN = wijeM 
livesinN = livesinM except that livesinN(BILLSWIFE) = VancouverN. 
It is easy to see that N is a model of A because all the axioms of A are true in N. 
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Furthermore, by construction, N is an Ab;livesin-submodel of M, since N only differs 
from M in its denotations of Ab and livesin, and since AbN ~ Air. However, M is not an 
Ab;livesin-submodel of N, since Air ~ AbN. This contradicts the supposition that M is an 
Ab;Zivesin-minimal model of A and hence also the assumption that livesinM(BILLSWIFE) 
can be anything besides the denotation of Vancouver. In other words, livesin(wife(Bill)) 
Vancouver is entailed by every Ab;livesin-minimal model of A, and therefore by 
CIRC(A;Ab;livesin). 
The new version of circumscription also works for the example about Jack and Jill's father: 
To show that CIRC(A;Ab;fatherof) f: fatherof(Jill) = James, consider the Ab;fatherof-
minimal models of A. Suppose M to be any Ab;fatherof-minimal model of A and assume 
that fathero.f1(Jilf'1) is some object in the domain, say s, other than the denotation of 
James. 
Construct an interpretation M' as follows: let I M' I = I M I , let the denotations of all 
individual constants be the same in M' as in M and let the denotation of Siblings be the 
same too. However, let Air' =Air - {(Jack!"",Jilf'1),(Jilf'1,Jack!"")} and letfathero.f1' = 
fathero.f1 except thatfathero.f1'(Jilf'1') = JamesM'. (Note that both ordered pairs 
(Jack!"" ,Jilt-1) and (Jilt-1,Jack!"") must be in A~ to satisfy the first axiom since both ordered 
pairs are in SiblingsM (in order to satisfy the fourth and third axioms) andfathero.f1(Jilf'1) 
= s ~ fathero.f1(Jack!"") = JamesM.) 
M' is a model of A because all axioms of A are true in M': To confirm that the first 
axiom is true in M', consider a valuation v in M'. If (v(x),v(y)) is anything besides 
(Jack!"'' ,Jilt-1') or (Jilt-1' ,Jack!"''), v must satisfy the first axiom, since any valuation w in M 
satisfies the first axiom, and M' is identical to M in its denotations of all individual 
constants as well as that of Siblings, and the denotation of Ab in M' only differs from that 
of Min that it does not contain the ordered pairs (Jack!"",Jilt-1) and (Jilt-1,Jack!""). Let 
(v(x), v(y)) therefore be (Jack!""',Jilf"''). Well (Jack!""',Jilt-1') E SiblingsM, (Jack!""',Jilf"'') <t 
A~' andfathero.f1'(Jilf'1') = fathero.f1'(Jack!""') = JamesM'. Therefore v satisfies the first 
axiom. A similar argument holds if (v(x),v(y)) is (Jilf"',Jack!""). The first axiom is 
therefore true in M' since it is satisfied by all valuations in M'. 
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It is straightforward to check that the final three axioms of A are also true in M'. M' is 
therefore a model of A. 
Furthermore, by construction, M' is an AbJatherof-submodel of M, since M' only differs 
from M in its denotations of Ab and fatherof, and since At/1' £ At/1. However, M is not 
an AbJatherof-submodel of M', since AIJM It AIJM'. This contradicts the supposition that M 
is an AbJatherof-minimal model of A and hence also the assumption that fatheroJvl(Jilfl) 
can be anything besides the denotation of James. In other words, fatherof{Jil[) = James is 
entailed by every AbJatherof-minimal model of A, and therefore by CIRC(A;AbJatherof). 
Standard circumscription shares a flaw with the previous two versions, namely that they do not 
necessarily preserve satisfiability. (This can be shown with the same example as given for naive 
circumscription.) As with the previous versions, standard circumscription can be shown to be 
satisfiable for the well-founded sets of axioms, which are defined in this case as follows: 
Definition Suppose A is a finite set of axioms, P is a tuple of predicate constants and S is a tuple 
of individual, predicate or function constants disjoint from P. A is well-founded with respect to 
P;S iff each model of A has a P;S-minimal submode!. A is well-founded iff A is well-founded 
with respect to every pair of finite tuples P and S . 
• 
We have seen in the previous section that circumscription allowing only predicates to vary does 
not allow new positive ground atoms to be entailed for those predicates which are not allowed to 
vary in the process of minimisation. However, for standard circumscription, new ground atoms 
can be entailed for uncircumscribed predicates which are not allowed to vary in the process of 
minimisation. This is shown in the following example from [Etherington 1988]. 
Suppose we have the set of axioms A given by P(a) /\ P(b) /\ Q(b) and we circumscribe 
P in A allowing the individual constant a to vary. 
CIRC(A;P;a) = A /\ v~x((A[~,x] /\ vy(~(y)-+ P(y)))-+ vz(P(z)-+ ~(z))) 
= A /\ v~x((~(x) /\ ~(b) /\ Q(b) /\ vy(~(y)-+ P(y)))-+ vz(P(z)-+ ~(z))) 
We show that CIRC(A;P;a) f= Q(a) as follows: 
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Let M be any P;a-minimal model of A such that the denotation of a is not in the 
denotation of Q. We note that to be a model of A, the denotation of Q must contain the 
denotation of b. It follows from the assumption above that the denotations of a and b in M 
are therefore distinct. The denotation of Pin M must therefore contain (at least) two 
objects, namely aM and ~, for M to be a model of A. 
Now construct an interpretation M' of A which is identical to M except in its denotation 
of a: Let aM' = ~. It is easy to check that M' is a model of A. We note that M' is a P;a-
submodel of M, since all the constants in M' (beside Panda) have the same denotations 
as in M. However, M is not a P;a-submodel of M' because the denotations of a and b in 
M' are one and the same object, requiring the denotation of P in M' to only contain one 
object, namely aM', i.e. pM' is a proper subset of pM. This contradicts the assumption that 
M is a P;a-minimal model of A and proves that every P;a-minimal model of A must have 
the denotation of a in the denotation of Q. 
Since the P;a-minimal models of A are precisely the models of CIRC(A;P;a), every 
model of CIRC(A;P;a) must have the denotation of a in the denotation of Q. In other 
words, CIRC(A;P;a) f= Q(a). 
The Yale shooting problem 
A recent and famous example intended to reveal limitations in the forms of circumscription 
discussed thus far is the Yale shooting problem, constructed by Hanks and McDermott [1987]. 
Before stating the problem itself, some background explanation is required concerning how 
knowledge about systems in which changes occur can be expressed by means of the situation 
calculus. 
All the examples we have considered so far, eg. the Blocks World and Tweety, have only 
involved reasoning about states of the system which do not change. In other words, we have never 
attempted to reason about the effects of actions like moving a block or clipping Tweety's wings. 
The situation calculus is a fairly standard way, invented by McCarthy, of expressing (in a non-
modal first-order language) knowledge about the changes caused to the state of a system by 
actions. For our purposes, a situation calculus language contains individual constants of three 
46 
types, namely situations (which each represent the state of the system at a particular time), 
actions (which represent certain actions performed or events that occur in the system) and 
properties (which represent certain properties which hold in a situation), a 2-ary function constant 
result which is used to express the change of situation caused by an action, eg. result(a,s) 
represents the resulting situation produced by performing action a in situation s, and finally, a 2-
ary predicate constant Holds which is used to express what properties hold in specific situations, 
eg. Holds(p,s) states that property p holds in situations. 
Formalising knowledge about the changes brought about by actions in a system has turned out to 
be particularly tricky. Normally, properties are unaffected by actions, i.e. a given action changes 
a small part of the system and leaves the rest unchanged. For example, if I pick up a block, the 
positions and colours of all the other blocks remain the same. The problem is that models of the 
new state of the system can exist in which all sorts of things have changed. One way to remedy 
the situation is to add so-called frame axioms, eg. 
vx(Holds( ColourOfBlockA,x) -+ Holds( ColourOfBlockA,result(MoveBlockA,x))) 
and 
vx(Holds(ColourOfBlockA,x)-+ Holds(ColourOfBlockA,result(PaintBlockB,x))). 
This strategy requires a potentially enormous number of frame axioms of this type specifying all 
the properties that do not change from one situation to another. The question whether there is a 
more satisfactory strategy than the inclusion of frame axioms is known as the frame problem. One 
solution to the frame problem is to use a single general axiom which specifies that most things do 
not change, eg. 
Vpsa(Holds(p,s) A •Ab(p,s,a)-+ Holds(p,result(a,s))) 
Expressed intuitively, this axiom (which we shall call a persistence axiom) states that, normally, 
for any property p which holds in situation s, property p will still hold in the situation resulting 
from the action a. The idea is then to circumscribe Ab in this axiom, to make its denotation only 
contain those combinations of properties, situations and actions for which the action in a specific 
situation is known to change a property. 
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We are now ready to deal with the Yale shooting problem. The story is simply that when a gun is 
fired while it is loaded, a person (commonly referred to as Fred) dies. 
For this system, the relevant language consists of a situation sO, two actions, wait and shoot, and 
two properties, loaded and alive (together with the other constant symbols needed to employ the 
situation calculus, namely result, Holds and Ab). Notice that the individual constants represent 
abstract concepts such as the property of being loaded, rather than concrete objects like birds, 
blocks or a gun. 
In the original situation (sO) the gun is loaded and Fred is alive. Let A be the set of axioms 
consisting of the persistence axiom (given above) together with the following: 
vx(Holds(loaded,x)-+ •Holds(alive,result(shoot,x)) /\ •Holds(loaded,result(shoot,x))) 
Holds( loaded,sO) 
Holds(alive,sO) 
With these axioms we can conclude (without using circumscription) that 
•Holds(alive,result(shoot,sO)). However, if the actions wait and then shoot are performed in 
succession, can we still conclude that Fred dies, without using circumscription, i.e. is 
•Holds(alive,result(shoot,result(wait,sO))) entailed by A? There are no axioms in A involving the 
wait action, so only the persistence axiom is of relevance. Since no axioms confirm or deny the 
abnormality of the result of waiting, obviously the wff •Holds(alive,result(shoot,result(wait,sO))) 
is not entailed by A without using circumscription. 
This is a scenario in which we would like to apply circumscription to minimise the Ab predicate 
and hence conjecture that the gun is still loaded after waiting. (We should then be able to conclude 
that Fred will not be alive after the gun is subsequently discharged.) In other words, we want to 
determine whether CIRC(A;Ab) I= Holds(loaded,result(wait,sO)). However, Theorem 2.5 states 
that no new ground atoms involving uncircumscribed predicate constants can be entailed by naive 
circumscription. This is because there are models of A in which the gun (mysteriously) becomes 
unloaded during the waiting process (and even models in which Fred is no longer alive!), 
preventing the required atom from being entailed. 
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Consider the following two interpretations M and N: 
I M I = {SO,Sl,S2} u {WAIT,SHOOT} u {LOADED,ALIVE} 
· s(J'1 = SO 
waif"I = WAIT, shoof"I = SHOOT 
loadetfA = LOADED, alive-1 = ALIVE 
HoldsM = {(LOADED,SO),(ALIVE,SO),(LOADED,Sl),(ALIVE,Sl)} 
AbM = {(LOADED,SO,SHOOT),(ALIVE,SO,SHOOT), 
(LOADED,S l,SHOOT),(ALIVE,S 1,SHOOT)} 
resulf"l(W AIT ,SO) = S 1 
resulf"l(W AIT ,S 1) = S 1 
resulf"l(W AIT ,S2) = S2 
resulf"l(SHOOT,SO) = S2 
resulf"l(SHOOT,Sl) = S2 
resulf"1(SHOOT,S2) = S2, 
I NI = {SO,Sl,S2} u {WAIT.SHOOT} u {LOADED,ALIVE} 
s(JI = SO 
waif' =WAIT, shoot' = SHOOT 
loadecf' = LOADED, aliveN = ALIVE 
HoldsN = {(LOADED,SO),(ALIVE,SO),(ALIVE,Sl)} 
AbN = { (LOADED,SO,SHOOT),(ALIVE,SO,SHOOT),(LOADED,SO, WAIT)} 
resulf'(W AIT ,SO) = S 1 
resu[tN(W AIT ,S 1) = S 1 
resultN(W AIT ,S2) = S2 
resultN(SHOOT,SO) = S2 
resulf'(SHOOT,Sl) = Sl 
resultN(SHOOT,S2) = S2. 
To see that M and N are both models of A, we consider only the persistence axiom (it is easy to 
check that the remaining three axioms are true in both M and N). All the property-situation 
combinations in the denotation of Holds (in M and N) for which an action would change the 
property are listed in the denotation of Ab. This ensures that the persistence axiom is true in both 
Mand N. 
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To see that M and N are both models of CIRC(A;Ab), i.e. that they are both Ab-minimal models 
of A, all we need to do is to check whether each ordered triplet in the denotation of Ab is really 
necessary. In M, removal of any of these triplets will violate the persistence axiom since the 
necessary ordered pairs (required to satisfy the consequent of the persistence axiom) are not in 
HoldsM. For example, (LOADED,SO,SHOOT) is necessary because (LOADED,SO) is in HoldsN 
but (LOADED,S2) is not. In N, all triplets are essential for the same reason. For example, the 
triplet (LOADED,SO,WAIT) is necessary because (LOADED,SO) is in HoldsN but. (LOADED,Sl) 
is not. Therefore M and N are both Ab-minimal models of A. 
The wff Holds(loaded,result(wait,sO)) is thus true in M but not in N, which explains why it is not 
entailed by CIRC(A;Ab). 
This is similar to that which occurred in the Tweety problem. In the case of Tweety, there were 
some models which had the denotation of Tweety in the denotation of Ab and others which did 
not. The solution was to allow the denotation of Flies to vary in the process of minimisation. The 
reason why we allowed the denotation of Flies to vary (as opposed to other predicate or individual 
constants in the language) was because the abnormality predicate specifically represented 
abnormality with respect to flying, so we should expect that minimising the denotation of Ab 
would have an effect on the denotation of Flies. 
But what should we allow to vary in the case of the Yale shooting problem; Holds, result, the 
individual constants, or some combination of these? In this case, the Ab predicate constant is 
meant to denote all the combinations of properties, situations and actions for which an action 
causes a property which holds in a specific situation to no longer hold in the resulting situation. 
The most obvious choice is to let Holds vary. This was the choice which was tried when 
circumscription was first applied to the Yale shooting problem, but it did not work. The reason 
for this can be seen in the following two interpretations, K and L, of A: 
I KI = {SO,Sl} u {WAIT,SHOOT} u {LOADED,ALIVE} 
srJ< = SO 
waif= WAIT, shoof =SHOOT 
loadeJK = LOADED, aliv<!' = ALIVE 
HoldsK = {(LOADED,SO),(ALIVE,SO)} 
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AbK = {(LOADED,SO,SHOOT),(ALIVE,SO,SHOOT)} 
resulf<(W AIT ,SO) = SO 
resulf<(W AIT ,S 1) = S 1 
resulf<(SHOOT ,SO) = S 1 
resulf<(SHOOT,Sl) = Sl, 
I LI = {SO,Sl} u {WAIT,SHOOT} u {LOADED,ALIVE} 
s(}- = SO 
waif- = WAIT, shoot'-- = SHOOT 
loadetf-- = LOADED, alivt!- = ALIVE 
HoldsL = {(LOADED,SO),(ALIVE,SO)} 
AbL = {(LOADED,SO,SHOOT),(ALIVE,SO,SHOOT), 
(LOADED,SO,WAIT),(ALIVE,SO,WAIT)} 
result'--(WAIT,SO) = Sl 
result'--(W AIT,Sl) = Sl 
result'--(SHOOT ,SO) = S 1 
result'--(SHOOT,Sl) = Sl. 
To see that K and L are both models of A, consider only the persistence axiom (it is easy to check 
that the remaining three axioms are true in both K and L). All the property-situation combinations 
in the denotation of Holds (in Kand L) for which an action would change the property are listed 
in the denotation of Ab. This ensures that the persistence axiom is true in both K and L. 
To see that K and L are both models of CIRC(A;Ab;Holds), i.e. that L is an Ab;Holds-minimal 
model of A, note that the denotation of Holds in both K and L cannot be changed at all without 
violating some axiom of A. (If any one of the ordered pairs is removed from the denotation of 
Holds, one of the two final axioms of A will be violated. If any ordered pair is added to the 
denotation of Holds the second axiom of A will be violated.) In K, removal of any of the triplets 
in the denotation of Ab will violate the persistence axiom since the necessary ordered pairs 
(required to satisfy the consequent of the persistence axiom) are not in HoldsK. For example, 
(LOADED,SO,SHOOT) is necessary because (LOADED,SO) is in HoldsK but (LOADED,Sl) is 
not. In L, all triplets of AbL are essential for the same reason. For example, (ALIVE,SO,WAIT) is 
necessary because (ALIVE,SO) is in HoldsL but (ALIVE,S 1) is not. Therefore K and L are both 
Ab;Holds-minimal models of A. 
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These two Ab;Holds-minimal models show that it is not good enough to just allow the denotation 
of Holds to vary in the process of minimisation. Allowing result to vary is also necessary. 
Consider therefore an Ab;Holds,result-minimal model of A, say M, and assume that the wff 
Holds(loaded,result(wait,sO)) is not true in M. Note firstly that the ordered pairs (loadet/'1,s(JA) 
and (alivf!"',s(JA) must be in the denotation of Holds, in order that M might be a model of A. 
Consequently, the triplets (loadet/'1,s(JA ,shoot") and (alivr!"' ,s(JA ,shoot") must be in the denotation 
of Ab in order that the second axiom might be true in M. Secondly, the denotation of Ab must 
contain the triplet (loadet/'1,s(JA,wait") for the wff Holds(loaded,result(wait,sO)) not to be true in 
M. 
Now construct an interpretation M' as follows: 
IM' I= IMI 
s(JA' = s(JA 
wait"' = wait", shoot"' = shoot" 
loadet/'1' = loadet/'1, alivr!"'' = alivr!"' 
HoldsM' = {(Zoadet/'1',s(JA'),(alivr!"'',s(JA')} 
AbM' = { (loadet/'1' ,s(JA' ,shoot"'),(alivr!"'' ,s(JA' ,shoot"')} 
result"'(wait"',SX) = SX 
result"' (shoot"' ,SX) = result"' (shoot"' ,s(JA') 
for every situation object SX E I M' I . 
To see that M' is a model of A, we show that each of the axioms of A is true in M'. Consider 
firstly the first axiom of A (the persistence axiom). The only valuations assigning values to the 
variables p, s and a that need to be checked are (loadet/'1',s(JA',shoot"'), (alivr!"'',s(JA',shoot"'), 
(loadet/'1',s(JA',wait"') and (alivr!"'',s(JA',wait"') since the only two ordered pairs in Hold~· are 
(loadet/'1',s(JA') and (alivr!"'',s(JA'). The first two valuations satisfy the persistence axiom since these 
two triplets are included in AbM'. The last two valuations also satisfy the persistence axiom since 
result"'(wait"',s(JA') = s(JA' and (loadet/'1',s(JA') and (alivr!"'',s(JA') are both in Hold~'. To see that 
the second axiom is true in M', consider the following argument: In M, the value of 
result"( shoot" ,s(JA) cannot be s(JA, otherwise the second axiom would be violated, preventing M 
from being a model of A. Say result"(shoot" ,s(JA) = SD -;r. s(JA for some situation object SD E 
I M I . Consequently, for every situation object SX E I M' I , result"'(shoot"',SX) = SD. 
Since (loadet/'1' ,SD) and (alivr!"'' ,SD) are not in Hold~', the axiom is true in M'. The last two 
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axioms are patently true in M'. 
Since all the axioms of A are true in M', M' is a model of A. 
But by construction, M' is an Ab;Holds,result-submodel of M, since the denotation of all constants 
(besides Ab, Holds and result) are the same. However, M is not an Ab;Holds,result-submodel of 
M', since A!JM' is a proper subset of AEJM. This contradicts the choice of M as being an 
Ab;Holds,result-minimal model of A. The wff Holds(loaded,result(wait,sO)) must therefore be true 
in every Ab;Holds,result-minimal model of A, i.e. CIRC(A;Ab;Holds,result) I= 
Holds(loaded,result(wait,sO)). So, in every Ab;Holds,result-minimal model of A, Fred will be 
dead in the situation result(shoot,result(wait,sO)). 
Remarks: The Yale shooting problem illustrates the sensitivity of circumscription to the 
axiomatisation of a system. For example, if the second conjunct of the consequent of the second 
axiom, namely •Holds(loaded,result(shoot,x)), is left out, the interpretation M' (which 
incidentally is probably the closest we can get to the class of intended interpretations) would no 
longer be a model of A, destroying the whole argument. (Indeed, our solution to the Yale 
shooting problem, while based on that in [Baker 1989], is markedly simpler because Baker did not 
include the relevant conjunct in his axiomatisation). The lesson to be learnt from this is that we 
can't expect that the use of circumscription will always give the results we are wanting. It depends 
critically on the choice of axioms to represent our knowledge about the system. 
Secondly, the decision of which constants to allow to vary is often difficult. The problem of 
choosing which constants to allow to vary should be seen as part of the problem of axiomatisation, 
since the choice depends on the axioms themselves, on what common-sense conjectures we want 
to be able to make, as well as on the complexity of the problem at hand. There is no known 
algorithm for deciding which constants to allow to vary. 
In the case of the Yale shooting problem, the detailed exploration of various Ab-minimal models 
was necessary to come to a decision of which constants to allow to vary. This brings us to the 
final comment, namely that a semantic approach is very helpful when working with logic-based 
formalisms of common-sense reasoning. All the articles on circumscription on which our versions 
of circumscription have been based ([McCarthy 1980 & 1986] and [Lifschitz 1985]) as well as 
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most other articles on topics connected to circumscription have had a proof-theoretic bias, i.e. 
they work from the basis of the deduction of wffs from a set of axioms rather than the semantic 
entailment of wffs by a set of axioms. It appears to be particularly helpful to always view a set of 
axioms in terms of its models and hence to determine the wffs which are true in all models of the 
set of axioms. For example, this emphasis enabled us to get a clearer view of exactly what the 
problem with naive circumscription was and also how to rectify the problem. Furthermore, the 
use of semantical arguments enabled us to simplify some long-winded proofs given in the 
literature and to replace others which consist of nothing more than a few informal sentences. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PRIORITIES AND THE SCOPE OF REASONING 
In this chapter we consider some common-sense reasoning problems for which the versions of 
circumscription given in Chapter Two are inadequate. Certain technical adjustments to the 
definition of circumscription are given to cope with these problems. 
Prioritised circumscription 
The following example was first given in [Reiter & Criscuolo 1985]: 
Suppose we are given the following information: Normally; Quakers are pacifists and, 
normally, Republicans are not pacifists. Nixon is a Quaker and a Republican. A set of 
axioms A describing this system is 
vx(Quaker(x) /\ •Ab1(x) --+ Pacifist(x)) 
vx(Republican(x) /\ •Ab2(x) --+ •Pacifist(x)) 
Quaker(Nixon) /\ Republican(Nixon) 
The question is whether Nixon is a pacifist or not. Before deciding what we would like 
the answer to be, let us examine how standard circumscription operates on this question. 
Firstly, consider any model M of A in which NixonM E PacijistM. For the second axiom 
of A to be true in M, AbzM must contain NixonM. By a similar argument, in any model N 
of A in which NixonN fl. PacijisiN, AbiN must contain NixonN. 
As normally done, we circumscribe the two abnormality predicates. We allow the 
denotation of Pacifist to vary in the process of minimisation since, as the denotations of 
the Ab predicate constants change, we expect the number of pacifists to change. We 
therefore form CIRC(A;Ab1,Ab2;Pacifist) which is equivalent to restricting the semantics to 
the Ab1,Abz;Pacifist-minimal models of A. 
The class of Ab1,Abz;Pacifist-minimal models of A are partitioned into two subclasses: 
those whose denotations of Abi (but not Ab2) contain the denotation of Nixon and those 
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whose denotations of Abi (but not Ab1) contain the denotation of Nixon. In fact, in one 
subclass, the minimal models of A have the denotation of Nixon as the only member of 
the denotation of Ab1 and the denotation of Abz empty, and in the other subclass, the 
denotation of Ab1 is empty and the denotation of Nixon is the only element of the 
denotation of Abz. These two subclasses of the class of minimal models of A have the 
denotation of Nixon in and not in the denotation of Pacifist, respectively. Since 
circumscription entails what is true in all minimal models, neither Paciftst(Nixon) nor 
•Pacifist(Nixon) is entailed. The most that we can hope to entail is Paciftst(Nixon) v 
•Pacifist( Nixon). 
This should not surprise us, however, since reading the description given at the beginning 
of the example does not give us any clue as to what aspect of Nixon's convictions we 
should consider as being of more importance. 
We have seen that when more than one predicate is circumscribed "in parallel" in a set of axioms, 
we can find ourselves in a situation where the minimality of one of the predicates requires some 
of the other predicates to contain more in their denotations, and vice versa. This causes the 
minimal models to be divided into sub-classes in which the denotations of each of the predicates 
being circumscribed are "truly" as small as possible. Furthermore, this allows no new ground 
atoms involving these predicates to be entailed by circumscription. What we require is a way to 
specify which predicates' denotations should be minimised "first", or, in other words, which 
predicates should take priority in the process of minimisation. This is what prioritised 
circumscription attempts to do. Prioritised circumscription was first suggested by McCarthy in a 
1984 draft of [McCarthy 1986], and applied to circumscription allowing (any) constants to vary by 
Lifschitz [ 1985]. 
The notation P1 >- Pz is used to indicate that predicate P1 takes priority over predicate Pz. The 
notation l'1 >- P2 is used to indicate that the tuple of predicates P1 (whose individual predicates all 
have the same priority) take priority over the tuple of predicates 1'2. 
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Definition Suppose that A is a finite set of axioms in a first-order language, P = (P1, .. ,P11) is a 
tuple of predicate constants and S = (S1, .. ,Sm) is a tuple of individual, predicate or function 
constants disjoint from P. Then the circumscription of P in A with respect to priorities P1 :> • • :> 
P' allowing S to vary, is denoted by CIRC(A;P1 :> •• :> P";S) and is the second-order formula 
A /\ •3ctX(A[ct,X] /\ ct ~ P) 
where ct ~ P is an abbreviation for 
(<t1, .. ,ct") ~ (P1, .. ,P') 
where ( ct1 , •• , ct") ~ (P1, .. ,P') is defined as 
( cti, .. , ct") ~ (P1, .. ,P') /\ •((P1, . . ,P') ~ ( <t1, .. , ct")) 
where ( ct1 , . • , ct") ~ (P1, .. ,P') is defined as 
<ti :s; P1 
/\ (<ti = P1 - <t2 :s; P1) 
/\ (<ti = P1 /\ ct2 = P2 - <t3 :s; "P') 
/\ 
where <ti = pi is defined as 
cti :s; pi /\ pi :s; cti 
and <ti :s; pi is defined in the normal way as 
( <t/ :s; P/) /\ . . /\ ( cl>mi :s; Pmi) . 
• 
For example, consider the Nixon-Pacifist set of axioms given above. To resolve the 
problem, we need to ascribe a priority to the abnormality predicates. This is equivalent to 
deciding which of Nixon's convictions would be more likely to take precedence. Suppose 
we decide that Nixon's convictions as a Republican will take precedence over the fact that 
he is a Quaker. In other words, Ab1 must be of higher priority than Ab2. We therefore 
determine CIRC(A;Ab1 :>Abz;Pacifist): 
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A /\ v<I>1<I>2'lr(A[<I>1,<I>2,'lr] /\ (<I>z s; Abz /\ (<I>z = Abz-+ <I>2 s; Ab2)) /\ 
•(Abz s; <I>z /\ (Abz = <I>z -+ Abz s; <I>2))) 
which is equivalent to 
A /\ v<I>1<I>2'lr(A[<I>1,<I>2,'lr] /\ (<I>z s; Abz /\ ((<I>z s; Abz /\ Abz s; <I>z)-+ <I>2 s; Abz)) /\ 
•(Abz s; <I>z /\ ((Abz s; <I>z /\ <I>z s; Abz) -+ Abz s; <I>2))) 
This states that .. (what does this state?) 
Fortunately there is an alternative to the above definition of prioritised circumscription. It consists 
of rewriting the prioritised circumscription as a conjunction of parallel circumscriptions: 
Theorem 3.1 [Lifschitz 1985] 
CIRC(A;P1 >- .. >-P";S) is equivalent to 
CIRC(A;P1, •• ,P';S) /\ CIRC(A;P2, .. ,P';S) /\ .. /\ CIRC(A;P';S) . 
• 
This theorem considerably simplifies the prioritised circumscription of a set of axioms. 
For example, CIRC(A;Abz >-Ab2;Pacifist) 
= CIRC(A;Abz ,Ab2;Pacifist) /\ CIRC(A;Abz;Pacifist) 
= A /\ •3<l>1<I>2'lr(A[<I>1,<I>2,'lr] /\ <I>z < Abz /\ <I>2 < Ab2) /\ 
A /\ •3<l>2'lr(A[<I>2,'lr] /\ <1>2 < Ab2) 
Expressed intuitively, this states that the denotation of Abz must be as small as possible, 
i.e. empty in this case (which consequently forces the denotation of Ni.xon to be in the 
denotation of Abz), and then that the denotation of Abz must be as small as possible, i.e. 
that it must not contain anything besides the denotation of Ni.xon. The denotation of Ni.xon 
is therefore not in the denotation of Pacifist in every model of the prioritised 
circumscription of the set of axioms, and therefore the wff •Pacifist(Ni.xon) is entailed 
thereby. 
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Scoped circumscription 
A special kind of problem in the application of circumscriptiOn occurs when an axiom asserting 
the existence of an anonymous counter-example to a default rule is included in a set of axioms 
[Etherington, Kraus & Perlis 1991]. For example: 
Consider adding a counter-example axiom to our set of axioms for the Tweety example: 
Bird(Tweety) 
vx(Bird(x) /\ •Ab(x) .-. Flies(x)) 
3X(Bird(x) /\ •Flies(x)) 
If we circumscribe Ab in this set of axioms we get no conjectures about Tweety other than 
those entailed by the set of axioms themselves. More specifically, Flies(Tweety) is not 
entailed because there are minimal models in which Tweety is the only bird, (i.e. she 
plays the role of the flightless bird required by the counter-example axiom). Even if we 
add axioms asserting the existence of birds other than Tweety, circumscription has no way 
of preferring Tweety's flying to that of any other bird. 
Note that not all counter-example axioms give this problem. For example, if we add 
3X(Bird(x) /\ •Flies(x) /\ •(x = Tweety)) instead of the counter-example axiom used 
above, Flies(Tweety) is entailed by the circumscription of Ab. But the second counter-
example can replace the first only in a context in which we have the definite knowledge 
that a non-flying bird other than Tweety exists. This is more than simply affirming the 
existence of a non-flying bird, since Tweety might just have been the bird on which our 
knowledge is based. 
Here is another example: 
Consider the so-called lottery-paradox: It is usually safe to assume that any particular 
ticket in a lottery will not win, given the overwhelming odds against winning. However, 
the conjunction of such conclusions for each ticket in the lottery will allow us to conclude 
that no ticket will win. 
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More formally, the circumscription of Ab in the axiom 
vx( •Ab(x) -+ --, Wins(x)) 
entails vx(•Wins(x)). This conclusion is not what we want, however, since some ticket 
must win. However, the fact that some ticket must win is a piece of knowledge which is 
not included in this set of axioms. We therefore add a counter-example axiom asserting 
the existence of a winning ticket, to form the set of axioms A: 
vx( •Ab(x) -+ --, Wins(x)) 
:iX(Wins(x)) 
. However, there are as many minimal models of A as there are tickets (each with a 
different ticket as the winner). Since circumscription describes what is true in all minimal 
models, nothing can be assumed about any individual ticket. In particular, if I were 
considering purchasing ticket number 113, the common-sense conjecture that ticket 
number 113 will not win is blocked. The most that can be assumed is that if some 
particular ticket wins, it will be the only one. 
In general then, circumscription does not always allow us to make the expected conjectures from 
default rules when the existence of counter-examples is asserted in the set of axioms. However, 
human common-sense reasoning can generally cope with the existence of counter-examples. This 
seems to suggest that "normality" is applied in a more limited way in human common-sense 
reasoning than is done by circumscription. Generally, the intention of common-sense reasoning is 
not to determine the properties of every individual in the domain, but rather those of some 
particular individual(s) of interest. Common-sense reasoning says that we should only take the 
possibility that something is abnormal into account if forced to. Circumscription (as defined so 
far) forces us to consider as much as possible to be normal. This is a subtly different matter. 
In both the examples discussed above, the problem arises because the existence of something 
abnormal is entailed, but in some models the individual(s) we want to reason about play the role 
of the counter-example. Consider the Tweety example augmented by a counter-example axiom: If 
there were reason to believe that the anonymous counter-example was likely to be among the 
individuals of interest, one could safely make conjectures about the individuals of interest (i.e. 
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Tweety) without wrestling with the identity of the counter-example. The same thing happens in the 
case of the lottery paradox. If we could consider only the small set of tickets that we might 
consider buying, there should be no problem conjecturing that none of them would win. The 
underlying intuition is probabilistic: if there are n tickets each with an equal probability of 
winning, namely _!_ , then the probability that one of the tickets in a set X is directly proportional 
n 
to the size of X. The set X can therefore be thought of as representing the scope of our interest. 
As stated in [Etherington, Kraus & Perlis 1988], in human common-sense reasoning we assess 
whether our reasoning has. appropriately narrow scope, at least when challenged by evidence of 
exceptions. When trying to decide about an entire population of individuals, there may well be 
concern about making default conjectures. In other words, restricting the scope of our reasoning 
should provide a solution to the existence of counter-examples. However, we shall have to 
engineer such a restriction of scope without the explicit use of probabilities, because in many 
applications of common-sense reasoning no probability measure is known - even the precise 
cardinalities of the population and of the scope of interest may be unknown. 
Scope can be accommodated in circumscription by introducing a new predicate constant called 
Scope and then minimising the intersection of Ab and Scope. To represent this intersection, a new 
predicate constant D is introduced into the language and the wff Vx(D(x) - Ab(x) A Scope(x)) is 
added to the set of axioms. More generally, if we wish to minimise the intersection of the 
denotations of an arbitrary predicate constant P (i.e. not necessarily Ab) and the predicate constant 
Scope, then the wff defining the new predicate constant D will be vx(D(x) - P(x) A Scope(x)). 
To determine the scoped circumscription of Pin a set of axioms A, we firstly form the scoped set 
of axioms A' by adding to A one or more scope axioms (consisting of ground atoms involving the 
predicate constant Scope which specify the individuals of interest) and the wff defining the new 
predicate constant D. The scoped circumscription of P in A' then minimises the new predicate 
constant D while permitting P and Scope (amongst others) to vary. 
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Definition Let A' be a scoped set of axioms, Pa predicate constant and S = (S1, ... ,Sm} an m-
tuple of constants not containing P. Let Scope be the scope predicate and D the predicate defining 
the intersection between P and Scope. Then the scoped circumscription of Pin A' allowing S to 
vary, namely CIRC(A';D;P,Scope,S), is the conjunction of the scoped set of axioms A' with a 
circumscription axiom to form the second-order sentence 
. A' A •3<l>X(A'[<I>,X] A <I> < D) 
where X is an (m + 2)-tuple of individual, predicate or functions variables corresponding to the 
individual, predicate and function constants in P, Scope and S, and A'[<I>,X] is the wff obtained by 
replacing all occurrences of D, P, Scope and Sin A' by the variables <I> and X, respectively . 
• 
The concept of minimal models needs to be adjusted for scoped circumscription: 
Definition Let A' be a scoped set of axioms, let P be a predicate constant and Sa tuple of 
individual, predicate or function constants not containing P. Let Scope be the scope predicate and 
D the new predicate constant. If Mand N are models of A', then M is a scoped-P;S-submodel of 
N, written M ::::;;; D;P,scope,s N, iff 
IMI =I NI 
K!"1 = I(N, for every (individual, function or predicate) constant Knot in P, S, Scope or D 
~ ~DN. 
We write M < D;P,Scope,S N iff M ::::;;; D;P,Srope,S N but not N ::::;;; D;P,Scope,S M. 
M is a scoped-P; S-minimal model of A' iff there is no model N such that N < D;P,srope,s M . 
• 
Theorem 3.2 
Given a scoped set of axioms A', a predicate constant P and a tuple of constants Snot containing 
P, then the models of CIRC(A';D;P,Scope,S) are precisely the scoped-P;S-minimal models of A'. 
Proof Analogous to Theorem 2.1 . 
• 
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To see how scoped circumscription works, we apply it to both of the examples given above: 
To be able to use scoped circumscription on the Tweety problem augmented by a counter-
example axiom, we must first form the scoped set of axioms A' by adding a scope axiom 
and an axiom defining D. It is also necessary to add an axiom asserting the existence of 
an object other than Tweety: 
Bird(Tweety) 
vx(Bird(x) /\ •Ab(x) ~ Flies(x)) 
3X(Bird(x) /\ •Flies(x)) 
Scope(Tweety) 
vx(D(x) - Ab(x) /\ Scope(x)) 
3X(.., (x = Tweety)) 
(The reason why the extra axiom asserting the existence of an object other than Tweety is 
added is to make the set of axioms rich enough to allow the formation of the models we 
are interested in. In particular, we need an object other than Tweety that we can at least 
imagine to be a flightless bird to let Tweety off the hook. Without this axiom, models 
with domains consisting of a single object would exist. The counter-example axiom would 
then force Tweety to be abnormal. While we are willing to entertain the possibility that 
Tweety is indeed abnormal, we should not allow situations in which Tweety's abnormality 
is forced. Another way to think of it is that the scope of our interest should be narrow in 
proportion to the size of the total population, and this would not be the case in models 
whose domains consist only of Tweety. ) 
We wish to show that CIRC(A';D;Ab,Scope,Flies) f: Flies(Tweety). To do this, we show 
that for any model of CIRC(A';D;Ab,Scope,Flies) (i.e. for any scoped-Ab;Flies-minimal 
model of A'), the denotation of Tweety must be a member of the denotation of Flies. 
Assume that there is a scoped-Ab;Flies-minimal model of A', namely M, for which the 
denotation of Tweety is not a member of the denotation of Flies. Then to satisfy the 
second axiom, TweetyM must be in A!JM and to satisfy the axiom defining D, TweetyM must 
also be in /Y'1. The domain of M must contain an element distinct from TweetyM. Suppose 
s is such an element. Now construct an interpretation N as follows: 
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Let I N I = I M I and let the denotations of all individual constants be the same in N 
as in M. Let the denotations of the predicate constants be adapted so that AbN = AIJM -
{1\.veeif}, FliesN = FliesM U {Tweeif} - {s}, DN = lY'1 - {Tweeif} but let BirdN = 
Birc/'1. 
It is easy to check that N is a model of A'. 
By construction, DN is a proper subset of lY'1 since the only difference between lY'1 and DN 
is that lY'1 contains the denotation of Tweety and DN does not. In other words, N is a 
scoped-Ab;Flies-submodel of M but M is not a scoped-Ab;Flies-submodel of N. This 
contradicts the assumption that M is a scoped-Ab;Flies-minimal model of A'. To sum up 
then, every scoped-Ab;Flies-minimal model of A' must have the denotation of Tweety in 
the denotation of Flies. In other words, CIRC(A';D;Ab,Scope,Flies) f: Flies(Tweety). 
To use scoped circumscription to solve the lottery paradox, we must add a scope axiom 
specifying the individuals of interest (in this case, the tickets I might consider buying) and 
an axiom defining D to form a scoped set of axioms A', and an axiom ensuring that our 
scope of interest is not the whole population: 
vx( •Ab(x)-+ ..., Wins(x)) 
3.x(Wins(x)) 
Scope(Ticket2468) /\ Scope(Ticket2469) /\ . . /\ Scope(Ticket3011) 
vx(D(x) - Ab(x) /\ Scope(x)) 
3.x(..., (x = Ticket2468) /\ ..., (x Ticket2469) /\ . . /\ •(x Ticket3011)) 
We wish to show that for any of the tickets I would consider buying, common-sense 
reasoning says that I would not win. In other words, we wish to show that 
CIRC(A';D;Ab,Scope, Wins) f: •3.x(Scope(x) /\ Wins(x)). (We allow the denotation of 
Wins to vary in the process of minimisation because abnormality of a ticket has 
specifically to do with its being a winning ticket). Let M be a scoped-Ab; Wins-minimal 
model of A' and assume that there is one ticket among those which I would consider 
buying which will win in the model M. For argument's sake, say the denotation of 
Ticket2999 (namely T2999) is in WinsM and therefore also in AIJM. (Obviously T2999 must 
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be in ScoptA for M to be a model of the axioms.) Furthermore, T2999 must also be in D 
for the axioms defining D to be true in M. Also, the domain of M must contain an 
element distinct from T2468, .. ,T3011, says, to satisfy the last axiom. 
Now construct an interpretation N as follows: Let I N I = I M I and let the 
denotations of all the individual constants representing the tickets be the same in N as in 
M. Let ScopeN = ScoptA, but let AbN = WinsN = {s} and DN = {}. 
N is a model of A' because the first axiom is true in N (since all tickets not in AbN, i.e. 
I N I - {s}, are not in WinsN), the second axiom is true in N (WinsN contains an object), 
the axiom defining Dis true in N (since the intersection of AbN and ScopeN is the empty 
set) and so is the last axiom (since the denotation of Scope is the same in N and M, and 
M is a model of A'). 
By construction, DN = {} is a proper subset of IJM = {T2999}. In other words, N is a 
scoped-Ab; Wins-submode! of M but M is not a scoped-Ab; Wins-submode! of N. This 
contradicts the assumption that M is a scoped-Ab; Wins-minimal model of A'. Therefore 
the denotation of Ticket2999 (and any other ticket in my scope of interest, for that matter) 
cannot be in the denotation of Wins, for any scoped-Ab; Wins-minimal model of A'. In 
other words, CIRC(A';D;Ab,Scope, Wins) f= •3X(Scope(x) A Wins(x)). 
Previous versions of circumscription have suffered from various weaknesses, one of which is the 
failure to preserve satisfiability. In the corollary to Theorem 2.3 it was stated that the satisfiability 
of an (almost-) universal set of axioms is preserved by circumscription. The counter-example 
problem given above specifically involves the application of the existential quantifier to an atom 
involving a relevant predicate constant, which makes the resulting set of axioms, by definition, 
neither universal nor almost-universal. However, as shown in the theorem below, the satisfiability 
of any set of axioms A is preserved as long as our scope of interest is not forced to be infinite. 
Theorem 3.2 (Satisfiability of scoped circumscription) 
If the scoped set of axioms A' has a model in which the predicate constant Scope has a finite 
denotation, then CIRC(A';D;P,Scope,S) is satisfiable. 
65 
Proof 
Assume that A' has a model Min which Scope" is finite, but that CIRC(A';D;P,Scope,S) is not 
satisfiable. Then every submodel of M has a proper submodel. (Otherwise A' has a scoped 
minimal model, and then by Theorem 3.2, CIRC(A';D;P,Scope,S) has a model, contradicting the 
assumption that it is unsatisfiable). This means that~ must be an infinite set, but this requires 
both pM and Scope" to be infinite, since D is defined by the wff vx(D(x) - P(x) /\ Scope(x)), 
which contradicts the original assumption. 
Therefore, if there is a model of A' in which Scope has a finite denotation, then 
CIRC(A';D;P,Scope,S) is satisfiable . 
• 
Corollary 3.2 
If the denotation of Scope is finite in every model of A', then A' is well-founded (in the sense that 
every model of A' has a scoped-minimal submodel) . 
• 
This result has an interesting implication, namely that a set of axioms need not be well-founded 
for scoped circumscription to be able to work. All that is required is that the scoped set of axioms 
must have a model in which the denotation of Scope is finite. In the example following Corollary 
2.1 in Chapter Two (which showed that circumscription only preserves satisfiability for well-
founded sets of axioms), the denotation of P was forced to be an infinite set in every model of the 
circumscription of P, preventing any P-minimal models. However, scoping P so that Scope has a 
finite denotation will force the denotation of D to be finite, ensuring that a D-minimal model can 
always be found and thus ensuring the satisfiability of the scoped circumscription of P in the set 
of axioms. 
We have now completed our survey of five versions of circumscription. In each case we have 
illustrated, by means of simple examples, the weakness or inadequacy of the formalism to cope 
with some specific type of common-sense inference. We then attempted to show how the 
definition of circumscription can be adapted accordingly. Although there are other problems with 
circumscription which have not been not addressed in this text, an attempt has been made to give 
an up-to-date overview of the most important versions of circumscription and the most important 
results pertaining to them. 
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In the next chapter, we consider the feasibility of using theorem-proving algorithms to deduce the 
wffs which are entailed by the circumscription of predicate constants in a set of axioms. In this 
process, we will present some of the original versions of circumscription, namely predicate and 
variable circumscription. It seems as if it was partly the intention of these original versions, 
[McCarthy 1980 & 1986] and [Perlis & Minker 1986], to be able to employ theorem-proving 
algorithms. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THEOREM-PROVING ALGORITHMS AND CIRCUMSCRIPTION 
An implementation for knowledge representation based on circumscription would, according to 
Lifschitz [1985], include a database A, a metamathematical statement describing how 
circumscription should be performed, and a theorem-prover capable of deriving logical 
consequences from the result of circumscribing some predicates in A. 
The design of such an implementation has to deal with a major difficulty: the definition of 
circumscription involves quantification over second-order variables. As pointed out by Theorem 
1.4, no complete theorem-proving algorithm (with respect to the standard semantics) exists for 
second-order logic. In other words, no theorem-proving algorithm exists which is able, for all sets 
of axioms, to deduce all the wffs entailed by the set of axioms. 
Strategies to deal with this problem include the following: 
Be satisfied with an incomplete but sound algorithm. 
Use an appropriate alternative to the standard semantics. 
Examine the feasibility of replacing the second-order wff produced by circumscription 
with a logically equivalent first-order wff. 
In the remainder of this chapter we discuss the second and third alternatives in greater detail. 
Predicate circumscription 
Predicate circumscription is the original form of circumscription introduced in [McCarthy 1980]. 
This form of circumscription was devised specifically in order to sidestep the limitations on 
theorem-proving algorithms imposed by the standard semantics of second-order languages. More 
precisely, predicate circumscription amounts (although McCarthy gives no indication that he is 
aware of this) to replacing the standard semantics by a restricted form of the Henkin semantics 
(see [Shapiro 1991]). The result, as we shall see, is a form different from and indeed weaker than 
all the forms discussed previously. 
In the standard semantics of second-order logic, a unary predicate variable <I> ranges over all 
subsets of the domain I M I of an interpretation M. (More generally, an n-ary predicate variable 
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ranges over all subsets of I M I n.) In other words, by fixing a domain, one fixes the range of 
both the first-order variables and the second-order variables; the only further things that need to 
be interpreted are the constants. This is not the case with the Henkin semantics, in which the 
ranges of the first- and second-order variables are determined separately. In the Henkin semantics, 
the predicate variables range over a fixed collection of relations on the domain, which need not 
include all the relations. 
The crucial idea behind predicate circumscription is to adopt a Henkin semantics in which the 
predicate variables range only over the definable relations. (The notion of definability will be 
made precise in the paragraphs which follow, with the help of the notion of a lambda-expression). 
The effect of restricting the range to definable relations is dramatic: the second-order 
circumscription axiom may be replaced by a semantically equivalent set of first-order axioms 
(infinitely many of them), and so it becomes possible, at least in principle, to employ a sound and 
complete first-order theorem proving-algorithm. 
Definition If a is a first-order wff and x1, .. ,xn are individual variables occurring free in a, then 
the string Af1. . .xn(a) is called an n-ary lambda-expression . 
• 
Note that A-expressions belong to the metalanguage - they will not usually be wffs of the object 
language. 
Definition Let M be an interpretation of a first-order language and let Ax1. .xn(a) be a A-expression 
formed from a wff a of the same language. A relation R ~ I M I n is defined by Ax1 .. Xn(a) with 
respect to a valuation v in M iff R is the set of all n-tuples (s1, .. ,sn) such that, if the valuation v' 
differs from v at most in assigning Si to Xi, then v' satisfies a in M, i.e. Si = v'(Xi) . 
• 
Now instead of working with the second-order circumscription axiom v4>((A[4>] /\ 4> ~ P)-+ P 
~ 4>) and restricting the values of 4> to definable relations, the same effect can be achieved by 
working with first-order wffs obtained by the following process: 
Pick any A-expression, Ax1..xn(a), defining a relation of the same arity as 4>. 
Replace each occurrence of the symbol 4> in the unquantified wff ((A[4>] /\ 4> ~ P)-+ P 
~ 4>) by the A-expression Ax1. .Xn(a). 
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Replace each subexpression of the form A.x1 .. .xn(a)(t1, .. ,tn) by the application of A.xz..xn(a) 
to (t1, .. ,tn), i.e. by the wff a[t1, .. ,tn] which is the result of replacing in a the free 
occurrences of each Xi by the corresponding term ti (using the usual technical devices such 
as renaming bound variables to ensure that no variables free in ti, .. ,tn are bound by 
quantifiers in a). 
To illustrate the relevant concepts, let A be the axiom Red(a) A (Blue(b) v Red(b)). Let 
M be the interpretation with IM I = {1,2,3}, aM = 1, ~ = 2, Ret/'1 = {l,3}, Blu~ 
= {2} and = M as usual the identity relation on I M I . The relation { 1} is definable by 
A.x(x ...=.... a) because { 1} is the set of all values v(x) where v is a valuation satisfying the wff 
(x = a) in M. 
Taking Red to be the predicate constant P that is to be circumscribed, the relevant 
unquantified second-order wff is (<:P(a) A (Blue(b) v <:P(b)) A vx(<:P(x) -+ Red(x))) -+ 
\fx(Red(x) -+ <:P(x)). Substituting A.x(x ...=....a) for IP in the manner described above delivers 
the first-order wff 
((a a) A (Blue(b) v (b = a)) A vx((x 
vx(Red(x) -+ (x = a)) 
a) -+ Red(x))) -+ 
which expresses the claim that b is blue and a is the only thing that is red. (This claim is 
of course false in M, since the denotation of Red in M is not minimal - the definable 
relation { 1} is a proper subset of Ret/'1 that would function adequately as an alternative 
denotation of Red). 
Definition Suppose that A is a finite set of axioms in a first-order language and Pis a tuple of 
predicate constants. The predicate circumscription of P in A, denoted by CIRCPR(A;P) is the set 
of first-order wffs A U CS(A;P), where CS(A;P) is the set of all wffs obtainable from the 
unquantified second-order wff ((A[4>] A IP ~ P)-+ P ~ ct) by substituting A-expressions for the 
predicate variables of IP . 
• 
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Semantics of predicate circumscription 
Definition Let A be a finite set of axioms and let P be a tupie of predicate constants. If M and N 
are models of A, then M is a P-submodel of N, written M ~ P N, iff 
IM I =IN I 
K!'1 = I<!', for every function constant or predicate constant not in P 
K!'1 ~ I<!', for every predicate constant K in P. 
M is a P-minimal model of A iff every P-submodel of M is identical to M . 
• 
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness of predicate circumscription) 
If CIRCPR(A;P) f= a, then a is true in every P-minimal model of A. 
Proof 
Without loss of generality, we consider the circumscription of a single predicate constant P in a 
set of axioms A. 
Suppose a is a wff which is entailed by the predicate circumscription of Pin A. If a E A, then 
the theorem is trivially true. Assume, therefore, that a E CS(A;P), i.e. a is an instance of ((A[4>] 
/\ 4> ~ P)-+ P ~ 4>). Assume that there is a P-minimal model of A, say M, in which a is not 
true. Therefore there must be a :>-.-expression, say U, which can be substituted for 4> in ((A[4>] /\ 
4> ~ P) -+ P ~ 4>) so that the antecedent is satisfied in M, but the consequent is not satisfied in 
M, i.e. so that (A[U] /\ U ~ P) is true in M but P ~ U is not true in M. 
Now define an interpretation N of A as follows: 
IN I =IM I 
I<!' = K!'1 for every (predicate or function) constant K not equal to P 
pN = rJM. 
By construction N ~ P M. Also, N ~ M, because pN = [JM but pM ~ [JM. This contradicts the 
assumption that M is a P-minimal model of A. Therefore a must be true in every P-minimal 
model of A . 
• 
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Corollary 4.1 
If M is a P-minimal model of A, then M is a model of CIRCPR(A;P) . 
• 
The converse of this theorem, namely that the semantics for predicate circumscription is complete, 
does not hold in general. This can be shown with the following example: 
In order to feel comfortable with this example, imagine that someone has presented you 
with a somewhat inelegant axiomatisation of the set N of non-negative integers. The set of 
axioms A employs a language containing the individual constant b (intended to represent 
zero), the function constants (intended to represent the injective successor function) and a 
predicate constant P (intended to represent the predicate 'is a natural number'): 
P(b) 
vxy(P(x) /\ (s(x) 
vx( •(b = s(x))) 
y v s(y) 
vxyz((s(x) 
vxyz((s(x) 
z /\ s(y) = z) -+ x 
y /\ s(x) = z) -+ z 
Consider the wff 
a = vx(P(x) -+ (x b v 3y(s(y) 
x)-+ P(y)) 
y) 
y) 
x))). 
Let R be any P-minimal model of A. In other words, let R be a model with the extension 
of Pas small as possible. pR must contain bR to satisfy the first axiom of A. But then, to 
satisfy the second axiom of A, pR must contain sR(bR) as well as sR(sR(bR)) and so on and 
so on. The last two axioms force sR to be a one-one function, in other words, sR(bR), 
sR(sR(bR)), ... etc. must all be distinct values of the domain. Any interpretation of P must 
therefore contain a subset which could be mapped bijectively to the set of natural 
numbers. Since R is a P-minimal model of A, pR must be isomorphic (precisely) to the set 
of natural numbers, N. a is a statement which is obviously true in any such interpretation. 
In other words, a is true in any P-minimal model of A. 
We now show that a is not entailed by the predicate circumscription of Pin A. 
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Let N = {0,1,2, ... } and N' = {0',1',2', ... }. Suppose that Mis the interpretation with 
I M I = N U N'; ~ = O; pM = I M I and I" is the successor function in N and N'. 
We first prove that Mis a model of A: The first axiom of A is true because~ E pM_ 
Since the only values that a valuation can assign variable y to are elements of the domain, 
namely I M I , the consequence of the second axiom will be satisfied by any valuation in 
M. The second axiom is therefore true in M. 0 is not the successor of any element of 
I M I , therefore the third axiom is true in M. The final two axioms of A follow from the 
notion of a successor function. 
Observe, however, that a valuation in M exists which maps x to O', making a not true in 
M. 
We shall define below the notion of weak P-minimality and show that the wffs entailed by 
CIRCPR(A;P) are precisely those true in all weakly P-minimal models of A. M is an 
example of such a weakly P-minimal model. Since a is not true in M, a cannot be one of 
the wffs entailed by CIRCPR(A;P). 
Definition Suppose A is a set of axioms and P = (P1, .. ,Pn) is a tuple of predicate constants, and 
M is a model of A. Then M is a weakly P-minimal model of A iff there is no model N of a such 
that N <PM and all P1N, .. ,PnN are definable in M . 
• 
Theorem 4.3 (Soundness and completeness of predicate circumscription) 
CIRCPR(A,P) f= a iff a is true in every weakly P-minimal model of A. 
Proof [Besnard, Moinard & Mercer 1989] 
It suffices to show that a model M of A is a model of CS(A;P) iff M is a weakly P-minimal 
model of A. For simplicity, we consider the predicate circumscription of a single predicate Pin a 
set of axioms A. 
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(=> part) Let M be a model of A U CS(A;P) but assume that M is not weakly P-minimal. Then 
there is some model N of A such that N <PM. In other words, 
IN I =IM I 
K!' = K!"1 for all constants K other than P 
pN c PA 
where pN is definable in M with respect to some valuation v. 
Therefore, there is a wff {3, with free variables x1, .. ,.Xm, such that the set of all tuples (s1, .. ,sm) 
which satisfy {3 are precisely pN. 
Now M is a model of CS(A;P) = ((A['P] A 'P ~ P)-+ P ~ 'P). Let Ube the A-expression 
"hl:i..xm({3), and substitute U for 'P in CS(A;P). This will give ((A[{3] A {3 ~ P) -+ P ~ {3), which 
must be true in M, since 'P can be substituted by any A-expression. However, while (A[{3] A (3 ~ 
P) is true by construction, P ~ {3 is not true in M, since the tuples satisfying {3 are a proper 
subset of the denotation of Pin M (again by construction). Therefore, since M is a model of A U 
CS(A;P), the construction of N must have been illegitimate, i.e. M must by weakly P-minimal. 
Therefore, every model of A U CS(A;P) must be a weakly P-minimal model of A. 
(<=part) Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1. 
• 
As with naive circumscription, predicate circumscription can be adapted to allow predicates to 
vary. This version was called variable circumscription by Perlis and Minker [1986]. Variable 
circumscription suffers from the same weakness as predicate circumscription, namely that the 
models of the variable circumscription of P in A allowing Q to vary are precisely the weakly P;Q-
minimal models of A. 
The real problem with the strategy of expressing circumscription as a schema of first-order wffs, 
as is done in predicate and variable circumscription, is to decide what A-expression(s) should be 
used to substitute the predicate variable(s). The choice of the defining wff is crucial for making 
the required deductions by a theorem-proving algorithm. 
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Separable formulas 
We have seen that predicate circumscription, although succeeding in delivering first-order wffs, is 
weaker than standard circumscription. Lifschitz [1985] examined the question of whether some 
instances of standard circumscription could be described in which the second-order formula is 
semantically equivalent to a set of first-order wffs. (This is no longer a question of replacing the 
standard semantics for second-order logic by a form of Henkin semantics; it is a matter of finding 
some syntactical description of those second-order wffs for which the set of models can be given a 
first-order characterisation. That such syntactical criteria exist is clear - one example is provided 
by those second-order wffs in which no second-order variables occur. Lifschitz's achievement lies 
in finding a class of second-order wffs that is broad enough to be useful.) 
Lifschitz defines a notion of separability and shows that the circumscription of a separable set of 
axioms is equivalent to a finite set of first-order wffs. The advantage of this is that once the 
circumscription of the set of axioms is given as a set of first-order wffs, existing first-order 
theorem-proving algorithms can be used, for example the resolution theorem-proving algorithm. 
Definition Given a finite set of axioms A and a tuple of predicate constants P = (P1, .. ,Pm}, A is 
said to be solitary with· respect to P if A is a conjunction of 
• 
wffs containing no positive occurrences of P1, .. ,Pm, and 
wffs of the form vx(U;(x)-+ P;(x)), where each U; is a A.-expression of the form A.x(a) such 
that the wff a does not contain any of P1, .. ,Pm . 
Note that the above definition assumes that the arities of P1, .. ,Pm are all 1. This need not be so. 
The arities of each P1, .. ,Pm can differ, with the proviso that the A.-expressions U1, .. ,Um have 
corresponding arities. 
Any solitary formula can be written equivalently in the form 
N /\ (U ::; P) 
where N is a wff which contains no positive occurrences of P1, .. ,Pm and U is a tuple of A.-
expressions not involving P1, .. ,Pm. 
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Theorem 4.4 [Lifschitz 1985] 
The naive circumscription of Pin a finite set of axioms which is solitary with respect to P, 
namely 
CIRC(N A ( U ~ P); P) 
is given by 
N[U] A (U = P) 
where N[U] is the result of replacing all occurrences of predicate constants of P with the 
corresponding A-expressions of U in N . 
• 
Let A consist of the axiom Red( a) A On(a,b). The reader will recall that the wff 
vx(Red(x)-+ x = a), although not a consequence of A, is entailed by the naive 
circumscription of Red in A. 
A is solitary with respect to Red since A is a conjunction of wffs containing no positive 
occurrences of Red, namely On(a,b), and wffs of the form vx(U(x) -+ Red(x)), namely 
vx(Ax(x = a)(x) -+ Red(x)). 
CIRC(A;Red) = CIRC(Red(a) A On(a,b);Red) 
= CIRC(On(a,b) A 'tlx(x a -+ Red(x));Red) 
which is equivalent to 
On(a;b) A vx(x a - Red(x)). 
From this first-order wff equivalent to CIRC(A;Red), a theorem-proving algorithm would 
be able to deduce vx(Red(x)-+ x = a). 
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Definition Given a finite set of axioms A and a tuple of predicate constants P = (P1, .. ,Pm), A is 
said to be separable with respect to P if it is constructed by conjunctions and disjunctions of 
wffs containing no positive occurrences of P1, .. ,Pm, and 
• 
wffs of the form vx(U;(x)-+ P;(x)), where each Ui is a A.-expression of the form A.x(a) such 
that the wff a does not contain any of P1, .. ,Pm . 
Any separable formula can be written as a disjunction of solitary formulas: 
(N1 /\ (U1 ::;;; P)) v (N2 /\ (V2 ::;;; P)) v .. v (Nn /\ (V" ::;;; P)) 
where each Ni contains no positive occurrences of P1, .. ,Pm and each cJ is a tuple of A.-expressions 
not involving P1, .. ,Pm. 
Theorem 4.5 [Lifschitz 1985] 
The naive circumscription of P in a set of axioms A which is separable with respect to P is given 
by 
(D1 /\ (U1 = P)) v (D2 /\ (V2 = P)) v .. v (Dn /\ (U" = P)) 
where Di is 
• 
Ni[U] /\ /\ •(Ni[V] /\ (V < U)). 
j ;Ci 
Let A be the set of axioms 
(P(a) v Q(a)) /\ •(P(a) /\ Q(a)) 
Intuitively, A says 'a is in P or in Q but not both'. Suppose we minimise P. We should 
then be able to infer that a is in Q. In fact, we should also be able to infer that P is 
empty. 
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Now A can be rewritten equivalently as follows 
(Q(a) /\ •P(a)) v (P(a) /\ •Q(a)). 
A can now be written as a disjunction of two solitary formulas, namely 
Q(a) /\ (P ::;; R) /\ (S ::;; P) 
and 
where 
and 
•Q(a) /\ (P ::;; S) /\ (R ::;; P), 
R = Ax(x = a) 
S = Ax(false), where 'false' denotes your favourite contradictory wff, eg. (x = x) 
/\ •(x = x). 
Then CIRC(A;P) is equivalent to 
(Q(a) /\ (S ::;; R) /\ •(•Q(a) /\ (R ::;; S) /\ (R < S)) /\ (S = P)) v 
(•Q(a) /\ (R ::;; S) /\ •(Q(a) /\ (S ::;; R) /\ (S < R)) /\ (R = P)) 
which is equivalent to 
(Q(a) /\ (S ::;; R) /\ (S = P)) v 
(•Q(a) /\ (R ::;; S) /\ (R = P)) 
which is equivalent to 
(Q(a) /\ vx(false-+ x = a) /\ vx(false - P(x))) v 
(•Q(a) /\ vx(x = a-+ false) /\ vx(x = a - P(x))). 
A theorem-prover would deduce Q(a) /\ vx( •P(x)) from the above. 
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The above result cannot, however, be applied directly to circumscription if we want to allow a 
tuple S of (individual, predicate and/or function) constants to vary. However, every 
circumscription with non-empty Scan be reduced to circumscription with empty Sas follows: 
CIRC(A;P;S) = A /\ CIRC(3X(A[X]);P) 
where A[X] is the result of replacing all occurrences of constants in S with variables X of 
corresponding type and arity. 
The problem with this trick is that the set of axioms being circumscribed now contains second-
order quantifiers. Such quantifiers can sometimes be eliminated as follows: if cf> is a tuple of 
predicate variables and A is separable with respect to cf>, i.e. A can be written in the form 
(N1 /\ (U1 :::;;; cf>)) V (N2 /\ (V2 :::;;; cf>)) V .. V (Nm /\ (CJ" :::;;; cf>)) 
where the Ni are wffs not containing any unnegated atoms involving cf>, then 3cf>(A[cf>]) is 
equivalent to 
N1[U1] v Nz[U] v .. v Nm[U"] 
where each Ni[ U] is the result of replacing all occurrences of variables in cf> with the 
corresponding A-expressions in U. 
As an example, consider the following set of axioms, A: 
vx(Bird(x) /\ •Ab(x) -+ Flies(x)) 
vx(Ostrich(x)-+ Bird(x)) 
vx(Ostrich(x)-+ •Flies(x)) 
From A it is easily shown that all ostriches are abnormal. If we minimise Ab we would 
expect to be able to show that only ostriches are abnormal. 
Using the trick explained above, CIRC(A;Ab;Flies) can be rewritten as A /\ 
CIRC(3cf>(A[ cf>]);Ab). 
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Fortunately, A[ cl>] is separable with respect to cl>, since it can be rearranged into solitary 
form: 
vx(Ostrich(x)-+ Bird(x)) A 
vx(Ostrich(x)-+ •cl>(x)) A 
vx(Bird(x) /\ •Ab(x) -+ cl>(x)) 
The first two axioms contain no positive occurrences of cl>, so N is 
vx(Ostrich(x)-+ Bird(x)) A 
vx(Ostrich(x)-+ •cl>(x)) 
and the last axiom is of the form U ::::;; 4>, where U is "Ax(Bird(x) A •Ab(x)) 
We can therefore rewrite 3cl>(A[cl>]) as N[U], namely 
vx(Ostrich(x)-+ Bird(x)) A 
vx( Ostrich(x) -+ --, (Bird(x) /\ •Ab(x))) 
which simplifies to 
vx(Ostrich(x)-+ Bird(x)) A 
vx(Ostrich(x)-+ Ab(x)). 
Substituting this in CIRC(3cl>(A[cl>]);Ab) and using Theorem 4.4 we get that 
CIRC(A;Ab;Flies) is equivalent to 
A A vx(Ostrich(x)-+ Bird(x)) /\ vx(Ostrich(x) - Ab(x)) 
which is equivalent to 
A A vx(Ostrich(x) - Ab(x)). 
From this first-order wff a theorem prover would be able to deduce that all abnormal 
things are ostriches. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen how circumscription may be used to formalise certain types of common-sense 
argument. The types of argument for which circumscription is particularly suited are those which 
are based on rules of the form "Normally, such and such is the case". The underlying intuition 
would be something like the following: since we have no information to lead us to believe that the 
case in hand is abnormal, we assume that such and such is indeed the case. We have noted that 
this type of inference is non-monotonic - if information is gained affirming the abnormality of the 
case in hand, the inference can no longer be made. 
Both first- and second-order logic are monotonic, i.e. adding a wff to a set of axioms does not 
invalidate previous conclusions, or in other words, if A f: a then A U {P} f: a. Non-
monotonicity is attained by circumscription in the following interesting way: consequences of the 
circumscription of a set of axioms may not be consequences of the circumscription of an 
augmented version of the set of axioms. In other words, if CIRC(A;P;Q) f: a then it is not 
necessarily true that CIRC(A U {P};P;Q) f: a. 
We have considered various forms of circumscription. They differ in simplicity and power - in 
fact there is often a trade-off between simplicity and power. The relationships between the various 
forms of circumscription discussed in this dissertation can be illustrated as follows: 
Naive circumscription 
Circumscription allowing 
predicates to vary 
Standard circumscription 
Prioritised circumscription 
__ _. Predicate circumscription 
__ .,. Variable circumscription 
Scoped circumscription 
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The central and most generally useful form of circumscription is standard circumscription. Naive 
circumscription and circumscription allowing predicates to vary are special cases of this general 
form. Prioritised circumscription and scoped circumscription are elaborations of standard 
circumscription, which are intended to deal with certain types of problematic examples. Predicate 
circumscription and variable circumscription were presented as a way to express circumscription 
in first-order logic, to be able to use first-order theorem-provers to make inferences from 
circumscription. 
Interestingly enough, the historical order of development of the above forms of circumscription 
was somewhat different. The order was: predicate circumscription [McCarthy 1980], standard and 
prioritised circumscription [Lifschitz 1985] (which Lifschitz collectively called second-order 
circumscription), variable circumscription [Perlis & Minker 1986] and scoped circumscription 
[Etherington, Kraus & Perlis 1991]. 
Naive circumscription and circumscription allowing predicates to vary are in fact our own 
invention. They are reverse extrapolations of standard circumscription, matching predicate 
circumscription and variable circumscription, but keeping the definitions in second-order logic. 
In fact, another more famous form of circumscription, namely formula circumscription [McCarthy 
1986] predates variable circumscription. Formula circumscription is just a slightly different 
formulation of variable circumscription allowing a wff (i.e. a formula) to be circumscribed rather 
than a tuple of predicate constants. 
Furthermore, scoped circumscription was presented in [Etherington, Kraus & Perlis 1991] as an 
adaption of formula circumscription, rather than of standard circumscription. In keeping with our 
pattern of controverting the attempts to express circumscription without second-order logic, we 
formulated scoped circumscription in second-order logic. 
We have been very careful to maintain a model-theoretic view of each presentation of 
circumscription. In other words, we have gone to pains to consider the models of each 
formalisation of circumscription. In this way we have been able to consider precisely whether the 
formalisation of a common-sense argument does in fact entail the inferences we want to make in 
the argument. In fact, only in the fourth chapter, where we considered how a theorem-proving 
algorithm could be used to implement circumscription, did we consider what inferences could be 
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deduced from the circumscription of a (tuple ot) predicate constant(s) in a set of axioms. 
Otherwise, we have concentrated on what wffs are semantically entailed by the circumscription of 
the predicate constant(s) in the set of axioms. Even in the consideration of the use of theorem-
proving algorithms, a model-theoretic view of the substitution of ~-expressions in the first-order 
wff schema was invaluable in showing the pitfalls and limitations of predicate circumscription. 
The big problem with circuinscription (as with all formalisations of common-sense reasoning) is to 
represent our knowledge about the system we want to reason about. The problem isn't so much 
being able to find a representation of our knowledge (this is usually not too difficult), but rather 
to represent it in a way which is suitable for circumscription to be used to make the inferences we 
want. If suitable knowledge representation was only difficult for obscure and complicated 
arguments, we wouldn't mind so much. However, many simple common-sense arguments (like 
the Tweety examples) require a tremendous amount of time and effort to represent the knowledge 
about the system in a way which allows circumscription to precisely entail the common-sense 
inferences we would like to make. Part of the problem of representing our knowledge about a 
system of interest is deciding what predicates to circumscribe, and what constants to allow to 
vary. Although some rules. of thumb can be given, there is no step by step method or algorithm 
for making this decision. 
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